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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The aim of "The Russian Review" is to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article in this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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American-Soviet Relations Since Yalta

BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

THE Yalta Conference, held in February, 1945, represented a high point in American-Soviet cordiality. On paper most of the problems of the peace were more or less definitely settled there. Robert E. Sherwood, in his book *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, based on the Hopkins private papers, writes:

"The mood of the American delegates, including Roosevelt and Hopkins, could be described as one of supreme exultation as they left Yalta."

Now four years have passed since the Big Three conferred and made their decisions at Yalta. It is painfully evident that this conference, far from providing a final solution of issues raised by the war, has not been even a first step toward such a solution.

The Second World War has brought about the realization of a remarkable prophecy voiced over a century ago by the French publicist, Alexis de Tocqueville. In his book, *Democracy in America*, de Tocqueville wrote:

There are at the present time two great nations in the world, the Russians and the Americans. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided strength and commonsense of the people. The Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom, of the latter servitude. Their starting points are different and their courses are not the same. Yet each of them seems destined by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

The United States and the Soviet Union today certainly loom larger in world politics than has ever been the case in past history. Every European power, apart from a few minor neutrals, was either harnessed to the Nazi war machine or smashed by it. With the complete collapse both of Germany and of Japan there is no nation in the whole vast expanse of Eurasia that is remotely comparable with the Soviet Union in manpower, industrial resources, military installations, and preparedness.

Great Britain, which fought through the war without being invaded, is in a stronger position than any continental nation. But

Great Britain has been gravely weakened and impoverished. As a crowded island it is peculiarly vulnerable to modern weapons of air-borne destruction. Against the Russia of Stalin Britain weighs less in the scale of world politics than the Britain of Disraeli weighed against the Russia of Alexander II.

Stable peace, therefore, depends on understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union, more than upon any other factor. And the prospects of such understanding have become steadily dimmer. The barometer of American-Soviet relations has been falling continuously since the Yalta Conference and the end of the war.

Almost as soon as the Yalta agreement was signed difficulties began to arise about its implementation. The agreement contained the following sentence:

They (Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill) jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

But the ink was scarcely dry on the Yalta pact when the Soviet government through its Assistant Foreign Minister, Vishinsky, ousted the Rumanian government of General Radescu, and replaced his régime with a left-wing government headed by Petru Groza. There was no consultation with the western powers in this case. Unilateral Soviet action was the rule in the whole large area of eastern and central Europe occupied by the Red Army. This unilateral action, taking different forms in different countries, strongly promoted the emergence in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Albania, and Czechoslovakia of governments effectively dominated by local Communists.

Poland was an even more contentious subject than Rumania. The latter country had been an Axis satellite. But Poland was fighting Hitler at the time when Stalin had concluded his pact of non-aggression with the German dictator. The Yalta agreement called for the reorganization of the existing provisional government in Poland (essentially a Soviet creation) with "the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." This reorganized government was pledged "to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot."

However, the Soviet government and the provisional régime which it had installed did not, in the opinion of the western powers, live up to these commitments. Fifteen leaders of the Polish underground who had been promised safe conduct by a Soviet officer were arrested as soon as they came out of their hiding places. The election which was held in Poland almost two years after Yalta, in January, 1947, was neither free nor unfettered, according to allegations in diplomatic notes sent to Moscow by the United States and Great Britain. There were similar notes of protest, invariably rejected or disregarded, about alleged violations of the Yalta engagement to enable liberated peoples to "create democratic institutions of their own choice."

Despite these discordant notes in the Yalta symphony of harmony, the United States and Great Britain continued to pursue a conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union during the last months of the war. There was no attempt to seize Berlin and Prague and to take advantage of a favorable military situation in order to occupy more territory than had been assigned to the western powers by earlier military agreements.

There was a joint Potsdam Declaration about the postwar treatment of Germany on August 3, 1945. The secret agreement at Yalta which promised the Soviet Union South Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, joint operation with China, of the Manchurian railways, a naval base at Port Arthur and preferential rights in the chief Manchurian port, Dairen, in return for Soviet participation in the war against Japan was put into effect.

James F. Byrnes, then Secretary of State, went to Moscow in December, 1945, and reached agreements on arrangements for the administration of occupied Japan, on the admission of minority representatives to the governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, on a temporary trusteeship for Korea, on Soviet participation in a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and on some other subjects. And after prolonged and difficult negotiations the terms of the treaties with the countries which had taken part in the war on the side of Germany—Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland, were agreed on, and these treaties were signed early in 1947.

However, areas of disagreement proved to be more numerous and important than areas of agreement. The principal apple of discord was the disposition of Germany. The provision of the Potsdam Agreement that Germany should be treated as an economic unit was never honored in practice and very different political and

economic institutions grew up in the Soviet zone and in the three western zones.

The breach over Germany became much wider after two conferences on the subject of a German treaty, the first in Moscow in the spring of 1947, the second in London in December, 1948, ended in complete deadlock. There had already been an economic fusion of the American and British zones and the sequel to the breakdown of the London conference was a decision to set up, under American-British-French control a west German state, with international control over the allocation of production from the great German industrial center in the Ruhr. A currency reform, instituted in the western zones of Germany in the summer of 1948, stimulated a substantial revival of production.

The Soviet reply to independent action in the western zones was to clamp down a blockade on the sectors of Berlin which are under American, British, and French administration. No rail or highway communication with these sectors was permitted. This Soviet move, which went into full effect early in July, 1948, was counteracted by an expensive but effective American-British air lift, which supplied the minimum food needs of the Berlin population.

Direct negotiations on the Berlin situation between representatives of the western powers and Stalin and Molotov in Moscow led to no result because the Soviet military commander in Berlin, Marshal Sokolovsky, failed to implement the promises which had been given by Stalin in Moscow. The western powers then submitted the dispute to the Security Council of the United Nations. The majority of the members of this body voted in favor of a solution calling for the lifting of the blockade, to be followed by four-power negotiation about the use and control of the Soviet-sponsored mark as the currency in Berlin. The Soviet government vetoed this resolution. Further mediation efforts had not led to any solution by the end of January, 1949.

The blockade of Berlin, behind which is the larger question of an agreed settlement for Germany, was the most acute dispute between the Soviet Union and the United States in the latter part of 1948. There had also been a failure to reach an agreement about a peace treaty with Austria. Soviet kidnappings of Austrian officials and diversion to Russian use of resources supplied to the Austrian government under ERP were causes of friction.

Greece was another area of disagreement. A commission appointed by the UN to investigate the situation on the northern

frontier of Greece reported (the Soviet and Soviet satellite members dissenting) that civil war in Greece was being promoted and kept alive by the aid which Greek Communist insurgents received from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. These states, with Soviet backing, refused to permit this commission to investigate the situations within their borders. The Soviet spokesman in the UN, Andrei Vishinsky, in somewhat unparliamentary verbiage called the UN report "a pile of garbage."

There had been no approach to peacemaking with Japan, and Korea remained bisected into two states by the 38th parallel of latitude, the demarcation line between the American and Soviet spheres of occupation. A communist-dominated state, with an indigenous armed force, was set up with Soviet sponsorship in Northern Korea. The veteran Korean nationalist, Dr. Syngman Rhee, was head of an elected régime in South Korea.

There has also been conspicuous failure to find common ground on such projects as the establishment of a UN police force, control of atomic energy, and limitation of armaments. On the atomic energy issue the American position has been one of willingness to outlaw the use of the bomb on condition that there be far-reaching international control of atomic power, with detailed international inspection, and no application of the veto power to measures of inspection.

The Soviet Union has insisted on destruction of the existing stockpile of American atomic bombs, has been vague about the degree of control it would accept and has definitely refused to forego the veto. Issues like atomic weapon control and disarmament are closely bound up with mutual trust in the good faith and goodwill of the negotiating powers.

So long as this indispensable element is lacking, little progress is to be expected. Largely as a result of increasing tension with the Soviet Union the United States government took two important steps in 1947. The first was the promulgation of the so-called Truman Doctrine in March, 1947, in connection with a decision to send military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. Both these countries were regarded as threatened; Turkey by Soviet military power, Greece by Communist insurgent activity supported from without the Greek borders. The heart of the Truman Doctrine is contained in the statement:

"Totalitarian régimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or in-

direct aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

Later in the year, the American government committed itself to a plan for subsidizing European economic recovery through subsidies amounting to several billion dollars a year. The Soviet government refused to participate in this plan and vetoed participation by such dependent states as Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Marshall Plan, or ERP, is therefore in practice a subsidization of that part of Europe which is not under Soviet political domination.

Behind the immediate subjects in dispute lie fundamental divergences of viewpoint and philosophy between the Soviet and American governments. It is a matter of dogmatic faith with the Soviet leaders that "capitalist," by which they mean non-Communist governments, are certain to be hostile to the Soviet Union and to wish to destroy it. The Truman Doctrine and the ERP are denounced by the Moscow radio and by sympathizers with Communism in America and elsewhere as aggressive steps, designed to enslave Europe to Wall Street and to prepare intervention against the Soviet Union.

To the majority of the American people (for approval both of the aid to Greece and Turkey and of the more far-reaching scheme for European recovery was confirmed by the votes of the overwhelming majority of both Democrats and Republicans in Congress) both the Truman Doctrine and the ERP were necessary defensive measures against a Communist tide that was threatening to sweep over all Europe. The American government and American foreign policy are not dominated by any dogmatic philosophy, comparable with Marxism as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin in Russia.

During the war and for a short time after the war, there was general hope in the United States that, despite differences in political and economic institutions, the United States and Russia would cooperate in maintaining peace. This hope has been unmistakably dimmed, if not altogether destroyed, by Soviet actions and attitudes since the end of the war.

It is not a matter of intolerance in relation to a different type of political, economic, and social organization. Under ERP the United States is extending substantial aid to socialist and semi-socialist régimes in Europe. But such aspects of Soviet policy as the world-wide Communist fifth column, the disregard of treaties and international obligations, the refusal of access to news and information, the flouting of the authority of the United Nations loom up as

serious stumbling-blocks to mutual trust, cordiality, and understanding. There would probably be fairly general agreement with the statement of Secretary Marshall before the UN Assembly:

Governments which systematically disregard the rights of their own people are not likely to respect the rights of other nations and other peoples, and are likely to seek their objectives by coercion and force in the international field.

While the Soviet-American deadlock is formidable and gives little promise of a quick or easy solution, there is little reason to believe that war is an imminent probability. The United States, under its Constitution, can only wage war following a declaration voted by a majority of both Houses of Congress.

A "preventive" war, such as is occasionally loosely advocated by irresponsible circles and is played up in Soviet propaganda, is impossible in view of the American constitutional background. A declaration of war would only be voted by Congress if there were a flagrant Soviet act of international aggression or a direct deliberate attack on American armed forces or citizens.

And there are several reasons why the Soviet government, while probing every weak spot in western defenses and seeking to achieve its ambitions by methods short of war, will probably not precipitate a shooting war in the near future. (It is significant that, while there have been numerous truculent threats against the air lift to Berlin, there has been no serious effort to force or shoot American and British airplanes down.)

Russia's human and material losses in the last war were heavy and can only be gradually replaced. The Soviet Union, despite its vast reserves in manpower and its natural resources, is distinctly inferior to the United States in modern industrial technology. There is discontent in the satellite countries behind the iron curtain, in the Soviet zone in Germany. Last, but not least, it is almost certain that the Soviet Union is not yet in a position to manufacture the atomic bomb.

What seems most probable, if one looks ahead in American-Soviet relations, is neither a speedy peace agreement nor outright war. It is rather a continuation of struggle and conflict by diplomatic, economic, propaganda, and other non-violent methods. Of course there is always the possibility that an uncontrollable explosive situation may erupt almost spontaneously. But there is no convincing indication that either government is aiming at an early trial of strength by arms.

Music in Russia and the West

By WARREN DWIGHT ALLEN

Two of the few surviving civilizations of world history, according to Toynbee's *Study of History*, are the Western Christian and the Eastern Orthodox societies, both with their roots in Hellenic civilization. Now that these two have met, first in alliances, now in rivalry, we do well to examine their comparative histories. This is being done in many fields, but not as yet in the field of music.

The romantic notion that "music is an international language" is being put to its most severe test, in Soviet-American relations. This mutually intelligible medium, like other media of communication, is now restricted, if not closed by iron censorship. How has this come about?

The Eastern Orthodox society, having flourished for nineteen centuries in Southeastern Europe and for nearly ten centuries in Russia, was, of course, the first of the Eastern civilizations to come into contact with the arts and sciences of the West; but this contact began only a little over two hundred years ago. Between 1700 and 1800, cultivated, wealthy, and princely Russian patrons began to import Italian and French musicians for upperclass entertainment, but not until 1800 did Russians develop new styles of their own for an ever-widening public.

Since the late nineteenth century, the music of Russian composers has been most impressive; many of us may not realize, therefore, how relatively new is the Russian rôle in Western musical art.

It is understandable that modern Russians should now regard the Western music system as their own, but now the Politburo castigates Soviet composers for "deviation" and commands them to get back to "classical polyphony," a style unknown and never cultivated in Russia, except to some extent in folk music. It may be in order, therefore, to review the origins of Russian musical thought in Byzantine culture and to see how European music penetrated an "iron curtain" two hundred years ago.

Modern research has brought to light, just recently, the differences between Eastern and Western song in the early Middle Ages. It is now safe to hazard some general comparisons, thanks to the labors of Otto Gombosi, H.J.W. Tillyard, Egon Wellesz, and other scholars. Earlier students had assumed that the Byzantine Church

had carried on Greek traditions in religious song, but Wellesz calls attention to the fact that all Christian chants—the Eastern chants in Greek, and the Western chants in Latin, had their common origins in the Jewish synagogues of Syria.

The differences arose largely with the split between East and West, with the strongly contrasting social conditions in Byzantine and in Roman civilization. The former remained fixed and static, with none of the upheavals and struggles for power which marked the history of Roman Church and Roman Empire in the West. Until 1453, when Constantinople fell to the Turks, the Byzantine Church and State were one and indissoluble. While Emperor and Pope were striving for supremacy in the West, choirs in the East were chanting acclamations to the Byzantine Emperors. No Western choirs chanted acclamation to secular rulers.

Both Byzantine and Gregorian chant had much in common. Both were subtle arts, requiring well-trained singers; both avoided the tuneful regularity of popular music, and both were sung in unison, with no instrumental accompaniment.

But the centralization of power in the Byzantine Empire made it possible to control these factors much more easily. To this day instruments are rigidly excluded in the Greek Orthodox Church, and purely vocal hymns are kept free of all contamination with folk-dance, or theatrical elements.

The organ was known in the East long before one was presented to Charlemagne, but it was not used in the church. The Byzantine organ was a secular instrument; it is said that gold and silver were used in the organs attached to the imperial palace. Portative organs were carried in religious processions, but had to be left outside the Church door.

The Psalms were important in the Eastern, as well as in the Western Church; but the fundamental difference was in the relative importance of hymns.

The words and music of hymns have always been more or less suspect by the Roman Catholic Church. Their usefulness in missionary work and as aids to devotion have always been recognized, but their popular appeal has always made them dangerous. Hymns have been admitted to the liturgy, but in limited numbers, and for very special reasons or occasions.

But, Wellesz points out that hymns are an integral part of Byzantine liturgy and, it should be added, in the Orthodox Church in Russia today.

The reasons for this contrast are sociological: on the one hand hymns in the Western Church are close to the people, in origins and in musical appeal; the history of Western Church music is also bound up inseparably with the history of secular art music as well as with folk music. On the other hand, hymns in the Eastern Church had no connection with folk music and secular arts; the hymnographers of the Greek Orthodox faith worked within liturgical limitations, rigidly bound by liturgical formulas.

In the West, every hymn accepted by the Church was a new work of art, and became one of the foundations of Western music in general. This was true of the *Te Deum*, the Ambrosian hymns, the tropes, the sequences, the hymns of Herman the Lame, St. Bernard, and St. Thomas.

Not so in the East. The odes, *stichera* and other hymns of the Byzantine Church were conceived as:

earthly, audible echoes of the hymns which, according to Dionysian theology, are incessantly sung in heaven by the ranks of angels, inaudible to human ears but perceptible to the inspired hymnographer. . . . Thus the artist could never attempt to follow his own imagination; such a thought could never have occurred to him. He had to follow a given pattern. If he was a painter he had to imitate an already existing icon, which represented to him the visible manifestation of the immutable features of the saint who dwells among the angels. If he was a hymnographer he had to imitate an already existing hymn which was the echo, made perceptible to human ears, of the hymns of praise sung in heaven by the ranks of the celestial hierarchy.¹

Wellesz, after studying the 2200 melodies collected in the *Monuments of Byzantine Music*, concludes that "they are all built up of a limited number of formulas, short groups of notes that are significant of the *echos* of the melody."

In Gregorian chant similar formulas (psalm tones) were used, for chanting the fixed texts of the psalms. But no such limitations were placed upon liturgical hymns, with great variety of words and musical phrases:

The Byzantine composer had to submit to the exigencies of the Orthodox liturgy; his task was prescribed for him by the work of his predecessors. The melodic types he had to use and combine were to his mind the *apechema*, the echo of the divine hymns. The work of the composer consisted in giving the melodies a new frame by linking them together. . . .²

Close examination . . . will show how subtle the work of the hymnographers

¹Egon Wellesz, "Words and Music in Byzantine Liturgy," *Musical Quarterly*, July, 1947, pp. 302, 305.

²*Ibid.*, p. 307.

was in creating new hymns on the patterns of older ones. We are bound to admire the achievements of Byzantine hymnographers, whom we may call without exaggeration supreme masters of musical and poetic variation.³

Wellesz then adds, "nothing was left to chance, nothing was left to improvisation"; none of the "corruption" could creep into Byzantine chant which tended to spoil the purity of Roman chant in the West.

That verdict, however, contains an unintended indictment of the Byzantine system. Western musical arts, like other arts and sciences, had magnificent developments which could never have taken place in the Eastern Empire, for the simple reason that improvisation *did* take place and resulted in our peculiarly Western arts of polyphony (music in different parts).

Byzantine missionaries converted Russia to Christianity in 988-9. The Russians of the holy city of Kiev, both peasants and aristocrats, were apparently as impressed by Byzantine song as the Germans had been by the psalm-singing Romans several centuries earlier. Sir Bernard Pares points out that the Grand Duke Vladimir's people "soon became reconciled to their new religion, especially through the emotional appeal of its wonderful church music—illustrating the existence of another world, the spiritual, side by side with the temporal."

But Sir Bernard also points out that while the Russians were being converted to Byzantine Christianity, Poland was being won by the Roman Catholics, a fact which explains much of the tension between those countries ever since.

The history of Eastern-Western Christianity shows even greater cleavage, therefore, as the two faiths spread northward and the differences are shown in music. In the north and northwest, folk-music, folk-plays, and secular musical instruments more and more influenced the music of the Church. In Russia, however, these "corrupting" influences were kept out of church music just as successfully as in Constantinople.

Russians, intensely musical, and passionately expressive, had two allegiances: on the one hand to their impressive church music and on the other hand to their poignantly expressive or hilariously buoyant folk-songs and folk-dances, accompanied by their native musical instruments.

While the new religion was intrenching itself in Russia, there was strong competition for popular support with the wandering min-

³*Ibid.*, p. 309.

strels, or *Skomorokhi*. The latter were so popular that many villages were named after them. The Russian monk, Nestor, complained in his Chronicle (1068) that these minstrels were keeping people out of the churches. Finally, in 1649, the Tsar Alexis ordered ruthless suppression of "the Godless Skomorokhi," with their *gusli* (upright, 3-string zithers), and *domras* (ancient guitars), and had them burned in the public squares of Moscow. This was far more severe and the results much more lasting than the comparatively mild Puritan ban on instruments in English churches at that same time.

For about seven centuries, while the music of the West was undergoing such great changes, the *Znamenny* chant was sung without accompaniment in Russian churches. It provided the only basis for musical composition, but composers of hymns had to work within the same restrictions that had been imposed upon Byzantine musicians.

After 1700, Western infiltration began; under Western influence, with the introduction of staff notation, it became possible to harmonize Russian church music. Orthodox chants went underground with the Old Believers who practice it to this day. But even the Western influence was not strong enough to permit any instruments in the Russian Church, and all Eastern Orthodox music is still unaccompanied.

Seventeen hundred was a late date in the history of European harmony. Bach and Handel were on the threshold, with centuries of musical tradition and craftsmanship behind them. So the Russians took up harmony *without having to go through the laborious processes of experimentation which had made the art possible*, and with none of the basic philosophies of freedom which have given meaning to Western music.

Western ritual chants have achieved a vital sort of purity which has resulted from struggle against, not exclusion of, worldly elements. It is not the sort of purity advocated by Plato, who admired the Egyptians for preserving their chants, as he naively believed, for ten thousand years, and it is not the purity fostered in the Eastern liturgy, where new melodies had to employ old formulas. Most important of all, composers in the West were permitted to turn their attention freely to secular music, a field in which talented Russians had never written anything.

So after Peter the Great opened his "window to the West" with the founding of St. Petersburg in 1703, secular Italian music, espe-

cially the opera, was particularly appealing to the cultivated entourage of the Imperial court. But Peter died in 1725 and it was left to his female successors to bring in Western music, arts, and culture, languages and customs.

Opera came to Poland first, in the seventeenth century. The first Italian opera played in St. Petersburg was heard in 1732, but fifty years later the capital was one of the operatic centers of Europe. (Paisiello's *Barber of Seville*, in 1782, a whole generation before Rossini's setting was first produced there.)

During the reign of Catharine the Great (1762-1796), talented young Russians were sent to Italy to study. Fomin (1761-1800) was the first and Bortniansky (1751-1825) the most famous. These men, and later, Glinka, wrote Italian operas, but went home to be more Russian than before. This process has been repeated in every society which has learned Western techniques and applied them within an ancient, different culture. When the new culture has reciprocated and given back fine music to the West, the result has been mutually stimulating.

Of course, Russian music in Western styles was only for the highest circles in the eighteenth century, but an ever-widening public was cultivated in the 1800's. Japan did not become interested in Western music until 1867, and then it was military band music. By that time, Russian musicians were doing great things in opera, choral music, symphonic poems, and virtuoso solo performance.

The more superficial phases of Western music were not widely imitated in Russia. Russian soldiers marched to military music played on imported instruments, but brass band music did not enter into the culture as importantly as it did in Europe, America, and Japan.

The intense seriousness with which Russians pursued all music in the nineteenth century is reflected in the lives and works of the "Mighty Five": Balakirev, Cui the military engineer, Mussorgsky the government clerk, Borodin the professor of chemistry, and Rimsky-Korsakov the naval lieutenant. These men were largely self-taught amateurs; they came, as all great Russian musicians did, from the families of wealthy landowners; but they were not dilettantes. Their "modernism" was nurtured in St. Petersburg, hotbed of discontent, where great extremes of poverty and wealth were so noticeable. In the conservative center, Moscow, these young men were not at all popular. The most revolutionary composer of the group, Mussorgsky, rebelled against the stuffiness of academic conservatories in-

spired by German pedagogy; and he revolted also against injustice and inequality, as in his sketch of the two Jews in his "Pictures from an Exhibition." In this he describes in music the arrogant rich and the whining poor. He saw the sad plight of Russia in the song of the Idiot with which he ended *Boris Godunov*, and sounded realistic notes which were unheard and unappreciated in the Wagnerian age of romantic illusion. Rimsky-Korsakov, in his last work, *Coq d'Or*, ridiculed the stupidity of bureaucrats from a safe distance, but no Soviet composer would dare to ridicule the Politburo today. However, Shostakovich can ridicule the bourgeois polka and is universally applauded.

After the Revolution of 1917 the first demand for musical conformity called for a ban on bourgeois romantic music and on music that had appealed so strongly to the ruling classes of old. Mosolov glorified the Iron Foundry, and the younger men wrote hard, brittle, revolutionary music appropriate for a materialistic culture intent on mechanization at all costs. Work-song themes, with their rigorous descents from high notes, were favored in Red Army songs, the *Internationale*, and in Communist songs the world over.

But with the Stalinist switch in policy, revolutionary dissonance and work-song idioms of protest have been discountenanced, and the demand is now for pleasant, romantic nationalistic music. With the present policy of Soviet expansion, revolutionary music is forbidden more severely than under the Tsars. Curiously enough, the Communists in this country have followed the Moscow musical policy. Instead of singing forceful melodies of protest, the party line calls for nice American folk-music and Lincolnesque sentiments which are hardly calculated to overthrow our government "by force and violence."

The recent wrist-slapping of Soviet composers raises an interesting question. Is there an historical parallel between the control of the arts in the Soviet Union and the control exercised by Church and State in the Byzantine Empire? The obvious reply is Yes. Composers in the Soviet Union are prisoners; Prokofiev and Shostakovich are not even allowed to correspond by mail with their Western colleagues. And they are compelled to model their musical compositions after old formulas, with none of the freedom of expression permitted all composers throughout Western history and throughout the two centuries of free communication.

During the nineteenth century several great Russians became,

not merely westernized, but internationalized, and performed great services in building bridges between East and West.

They did more than any other group to bring the color of the Orient into Western music. They captured the French ballet, decadent in a sort of frozen classicism; Chaikovsky, Diaghilev and Stravinsky infused new life-blood into it. They revived the beauties of a *cappella* singing and made singers independent of instruments (too much so, at times) and in feats of virtuosity they have been unsurpassed. But with the ringing down of the iron curtain lifted by Peter the Great, such men have been stranded in the West—the late Rakhmaninov, Grechaninov, Stravinsky, and many others. The Russians worship Chaikovsky and others who were more than Russian in their outlook, but their rulers deny every value for which they stood. Now they seem to be turning away from the West—back toward the East—back toward Oriental despotism.

Is there hope? There is, on one condition—that both sides learn to understand each other. East and West have met “head on” for the first time. We shall do well to heed the warning of Lin Yutang, that the West needs to be cured of its “Hegelian swell-head.” Must we continue to study the history of Western civilization as a history apart, with an iron curtain which shuts out the East? And are we “superior” because of our technological cleverness which has made Western music so easily exportable, artistically and commercially?

Thinking Russians realize the debt their country owes to the West and were it not so dangerous, they could laugh off the humorless claims from the Kremlin that Russians have invented everything borrowed from their neighbors.

But the Russians do have something unique to give to the world, a mystic sense of the wholeness of life, and a realization that life is more important than art, more important than material possessions. With the present-day devotion to materialistic philosophy on the part of Russia's rulers, that latter statement may seem hard to believe, but it is not so difficult if one listens to the magnificent music of the Russian liturgy in its modern, harmonized forms. Although the techniques of Western harmony were borrowed from the West, Russian vocal harmony has a spiritual vitality of its own, when sung by a choir which has the complete range of Russian voices, from high sopranos to phenomenally low basses. It is impossible to believe that a people capable of such music can forever remain subject to a totalitarian materialism. Nicholas Berdyaev believes that the soil for a new, “prophetic” Christian conscience has been pre-

pared in Russia. He believes that totalitarianism, now going through a most vicious form, totalitarianism of the state, must be seen as "a perverted and (tragi-) comic form" before the true essence of spiritual totalitarianism can emerge, to make a total transformation of life in a world society.

That sounds to Western ears like very wishful thinking, because Western civilization like Western music, has developed *by harmonizing differences*, unlike totalitarianism. The latter is abhorrent to Westerners in any form, but we do begin to see the need for total efforts for total peace under world unity. The two extremes today are not capitalism and communism; they are totalitarian conformity and democratic improvisation. The two must be reconciled if humanity is to survive, but *music cannot reconcile these extremes*.

When these extremes *are* reconciled by each learning from the other how to live together—then, and not until then, will music be an "international language."

The Composition of the Dumas

By WARREN B. WALSH

APRIL 27, 1906, seemed to interested contemporaries to be a most significant date in Russian history and one which marked a new era in Russian political development.¹ On that day, State Secretary Frish, acting in the name of H.I.M. Nicholas II, formally opened the first sitting of the initial Session of the Duma. The interest and excitement were not confined to Russia nor to Europe. Feature articles about the Duma were printed in the American metropolitan press and even in some local papers. It was explained to American readers that the Russian autocracy was now legally limited by an elected, national, legislative assembly whose consent was necessary for the making of laws. The highlights in the story of this concession by the autocracy can be quickly reviewed.

Tsar Nicholas, yielding to increasing pressures, promised in February 1905, that a national assembly would be created and implemented the promise by directing Minister of the Interior Bulygin, to draft the plan for it. Before the draft was published, the Tsar, in June, re-affirmed his promise and invited public discussion of the project. The articulate liberal minority accepted the invitation with satisfaction. Their hopes ran high, but when the "Bulygin Duma" was announced by the Manifesto of August 6 their hopes seemed to have been betrayed. Bulygin's plan called for an assembly, elected on the basis of a very restricted suffrage and having only consultative powers. This was not satisfactory to the public or, at least, to that part of the public which had and expressed opinions on the matter in one way or another. The climax came in the General Strike of October, and Nicholas was forced to promise a legislative Duma, chosen by a wider suffrage. Continuing pressures led Witte to extend the franchise further by a law of December 11, 1905. This was the basis upon which the members of the First Duma were finally elected.

A few of the 497 members were known outside of Russia and more of them had national or local reputations. Students of Russian history will have no difficulty in recalling half-a-dozen names of the more famous. There was the distinguished lawyer and first President of the Duma, Muromtsev, the man chiefly responsible for

¹All dates in this article are according to the old style. [Ed.]

creating the excellent committee system of the Duma. There was the great liberal, Rodichev, and there was Count Heyden, leader of the conservatives. Many of the Duma's first parliamentary steps were guided by Nabokov, *Privat-docent* from St. Petersburg and skillful parliamentarian. The Duma's "Labor Group" was led by Aladin, a peasant; and Prince Urusov, justly famed for his fight against anti-semitism, was also a member. But what of the others? What manner of men were they?

Short of a complete catalogue no full answer can be given, but even a partial answer, based on the meager data provided to the Duma recorders by the men themselves, will throw considerable light upon the nature of this new institution. And when the partial answer is extended to cover all four Dumas we have not only another measure of Russian political development in these years, but also an additional answer to one of the problems of "The Year 1917."²

The largest single class group among the Duma members were the peasants who numbered 191 or 39% of the total membership. Since the peasants at that time constituted at least 85% of the total population of the Russian Empire, it is clear that they were proportionately very much under-represented. The gentry-nobility, on the other hand, were proportionately very much over-represented. There were 123 of them in the first Duma which means that every fourth member of the Duma was from this class. Considering the state of literacy and education and other limitations upon the opportunities for leadership among the peasants, it is less surprising that they got so few deputies than that they got so many. The wide-spread participation of the peasants in the elections to the first two Dumas is contra-proof to the claim that the Russian people never took any interest in governing themselves. When they had any chance to do so, they showed a very real and generally intelligent interest in self-government.

A wide variety of occupations, in addition to peasant-farming, were listed by the Duma members. Sixty-four men recorded them-

²All the data on the membership of the Dumas has been compiled or calculated from records given in the *Stenographic Reports of the Dumas*, published at St. Petersburg by the State Publishing House from 1906 and following. The specific references are: "Spisok chlenov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy po izbiratelnykh okrugam" in *Ukazatel k stenograficheskim otchetam, 1906 god. Sessiya pervaya*, pp. 3-17; *Ukazatel k stenograficheskim otchetam. Vtoroi sozyv. 1907 god*, pp. 3-26; "Lichnyi alfavitnyi ukazatel k stenograficheskim otchetam Gosud. Dumy" in *Ukazatel . . . (Chasti I-III) Tretii sozyv. Sessiya pervaya*, pp. 51-311; and "Lichnyi alfavitnyi. . . ." In *Ukazatel . . . (Chasti I-III) Chetvertiy sozyv. Sessiya pervaya*, pp. 55-224.

selves as professional people without indicating their legal class. Doctors, lawyers, teachers, and journalists were the most common, but the professional group also included: engineers, surveyors, agronomes, and one "man of letters" (*literator*). Two members listed themselves only as "Ph. D.s". One called himself "a colonist" and perhaps the most amusing was the man who enrolled himself as "candidate for the Zemstvo Board," but didn't say whether his candidacy was a thing of the past, present, or future.

About a third of the members indicated that they had or had had some connection either with the government or with public service such as the Zemstva. There were twenty workers (*rabochie*) and only three "industrialists." Thirteen clergy, mostly of the Russian Orthodox Church but including also some Mullahs, Rabbis, and Roman Catholic priests, were also elected to this first Duma. Nationalities are not shown in the Duma records for this Session.

The Second Duma was convened on February 20, 1907. It held fifty-three sittings before the Tsar dissolved it on June 2d. In terms of party alignments this Duma was to the left of its predecessor. This may be accounted for in part by the removal of the boycotts against participation by the Social Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats. Sir Bernard Pares reported at the time that the peasants often deliberately chose professional revolutionaries to represent them and this may also be a partial explanation of the leftward swing. At any rate this Duma was almost entirely composed of new men. Only 6% (31 members) of the 520 members of the Second Duma had also been members of the First. This turnover was due chiefly to the outlawing from candidacy by the government of all those who signed the Viborg Manifesto in protest against the dissolution of the First Duma.

The number of peasant deputies was exactly the same as before, but percentage-wise it was slightly lower (35%) due to the larger membership. The gentry-nobility increased their membership both absolutely and relatively. Twenty-two per cent of the members of this second session classified themselves as landlords (*zemlevladeletsy*) and 33% listed themselves as farmers (*zemledeltsy*). There was again a considerable number of professional men and of officials of all sorts. The number of workers went up to thirty-three. Industrial capitalism was "represented" by three factory owners; mercantile capitalism, by seventeen traders (*torgovtsy*) and eleven shop-keepers (*kuptsy*). Just over half the members (51%) reported themselves as owning property of some sort.

It will come as a surprise to those who have assumed that no recognition whatever was given to the minority nationalities before the Revolution to learn that twenty-eight different national groups sent members to the Second Duma. Too much should not be made of this point since seventeen of the groups had less than six representatives each while the Great Russians had 326 or over 62% of the total. The largest non-Russian Slavic group was Polish which numbered 46, and the largest non-Slavic contingent were the fifteen Tatars. Fifteen Asiatic groups had at least one member each and some had several. For example, there were seven Kirghiz and four Bashkirs.

Among the several unusual occupations listed by the members, the two outstanding were "sultan" and "poet and satirist." There were also eight cattle-breeders, two veterinaries, and a single blacksmith.

Following the abrupt dismissal of the Second Duma on the trumped-up charge that certain of its members were conspiring against the government, the electoral law was altered in direct violation of the Fundamental Laws of the Empire. The explanation frequently given that these changes were made under the authority of the famous Section 87 is not accurate. According to the Fundamental Laws no changes in the election laws were to be made except with the concurrence of the Duma itself. The changes produced by this veritable *coup d'état* are very noticeable in the social and occupational composition of the Third Duma.

The proportion of *dvoryane* (nobility) plus *krestyane* (peasants) to the total membership remained constant. It had been 64% in the First; 63% in the Second; and stood again at 63% in the Third. But the relations within this combination shifted markedly. Only 19% of the members of the Third Duma were peasants as compared to 39% in the First and 36% in the Second. The percentage of *dvoryane*, however, increased from 25% (First) to 28% (Second) and then jumped to 44% in the Third. Moreover, almost half the members of the Third Duma were landowners. This was more than twice the number in the preceding Duma. It is even more noteworthy that 98% of the members of the Third Duma were property-owners. This alone indicates the extent and nature of the changes brought by the electoral coup.

The number of professional men decreased somewhat while that of the officials markedly increased. Workers almost vanished. There were five among the members. On the other hand, there were two

"bankers," two "capitalists," and three "industrialists." The number of clergy almost quadrupled and all of them were allied to the more conservative parties. Only twenty national groups had members in this Duma and fifteen of these had six deputies or less. The number of Great Russians increased considerably and of Germans, slightly. The number of Ukrainians, Poles, Tatars, Jews, and Georgians decreased. In the Fourth Duma there was a further increase in the number of Great Russian deputies while the number of Ukrainians was cut from 25 to 10, of Bielorussians from 12 to 6, and of Poles from 18 to 16. Only five Asiatic peoples sent deputies to this Fourth Duma as compared to fifteen in the Second.

The Fourth Duma had more deputies of the nobility class than any of the preceding sessions. Fifty-one per cent, a slight but absolute majority, were from this class. This is more than twice the percentage of *dvoryane* in the First Duma. The number of peasant deputies increased very slightly but remained the same percentage-wise. There were fewer professional men and slightly more officials than in the Third. Forty of the forty-eight clergy belonged to the parties farthest to the right. One hundred and nineteen deputies were landowners (one of them owned 270,000 acres) and 93% owned property of some sort and value. There were only three workers among the membership. In short, the shifts begun in the Third Duma were strengthened and continued in the Fourth.

It may be said by way of summary that the records show clearly that none of the four Dumas accurately or completely represented the Russian people. Variations in classification make precision impossible, but the following rough approximations will demonstrate the point. In the First Duma, there was approximately one peasant deputy for each 800,000 peasants in the Empire. The ratio for the nobility was one to 28,000; and for the urban workers, one to 150,000. The latter gained considerably in the Second Duma when their ratio was one worker deputy to every 91,000 urban workers in the country. The proportion for the nobility was one to 25,000; and for the peasants, one to 900,000. The effects of the Stolypin "reform" show up spectacularly in the last two Dumas. The peasant ratio in both these was roughly one to 1,700,000; i.e., their representation was cut almost in half. For the workers the figures for the Third Duma were one to 600,000; and for the Fourth, one to 1,000,000. Their representation was reduced by over 90% between the Second and the Fourth Duma. The reverse of the picture appears in the propor-

tional figures for the nobility. In the Third Duma, there was one member of this class in the Duma for every 17,000 outside. It was at the ratio of one to 15,000 in the last Duma. The *dvoryane*, in other words had almost doubled their strength between the first and the last Dumas.

These changes, although not without a certain amount of interest in their own right, would be of relatively less significance if the Fourth Duma had lived out its life in "normal" times. But that is precisely what did not happen. The Session began on November 15, 1912, in the prosperous days of peace. It came to a *de facto* if not a *de jure* end on February 27, 1917. Between these two dates had come the first World War and the final moral and political bankruptcy of the tsardom. The Fourth Duma was dissolved by Imperial order but its Senior Council, composed of the heads of the various political parties, ordered the members not to disperse. The Council also organized an Executive Committee composed of thirteen men under the presidency of Rodzianko. The Provisional Government was appointed by the Executive Committee with the quasi-blessing of the Petrograd Soviet. Two of the ten members of the Provisional Government were Octobrists, and seven were Kadets. In other words, it was a government run by representatives of those classes which had dominated the Third and Fourth Dumas.

We have just seen that although none of the Dumas completely or accurately represented the Russian people, the first two Dumas came much closer to it than did the Third or Fourth. If Stolypin had not radically altered the composition of the Dumas would the Provisional Government, child of the Fourth Duma, have been able to establish a working understanding with the people? Of course, no one can say, but the chances would certainly have been better. Stolypin's illegal curtailment of the suffrage ranks as one of the many ironies of history. Aimed at the strengthening of the autocracy, it finally had the wholly unplanned effect of contributing notably to the success of Lenin in 1917.

Universal Military Service in Russia and Western Europe

By A. M. NIKOLAIEFF

IT is commonly known that universal military service as the duty of every citizen was the product of the French Revolution. In 1798, it thus became possible for the French to assemble and maintain armies of much greater numerical superiority than those recruited by voluntary enlistment or by contract.

But it is a fact little known, except to students of Russian history, that the principle of universal military service had been first applied in Russia in 1705, ninety-three years before it was proclaimed in France. Peter the Great, being in great need of militarily trained men for the anticipated invasion of Charles XII of Sweden, had taken a step that gave him all the man-power he needed for continuing and winning the fateful war. This step was the establishment of conscription as a system of recruiting the Russian army.

Although the new method of recruiting and mobilization was of the highest importance, it was not revolutionary. Actually, before Peter's momentous reform, the Russian upper class was bound to life-time service in the army and had been granted land only on that condition. At the outbreak of war, they were expected to appear for military duty with those men in their service armed, equipped, and mounted at their masters' expense. A certain number of the peasant class was periodically drafted, but these drafted men (*datochnye liudi*) were called to serve, like the landowners, only in an emergency. Besides, there existed in Russia several kinds of troops serving in time of peace, consisting of infantry regiments (*streltsy*) stationed in Moscow and various cities, regiments "organized on a foreign model" (*polki inozemnago stroiya*), Cossacks, and artillery men headed by a special officer (*pushkarskii golova*). All these troops were recruited by volunteers who usually were granted plots of land as a reward for their services. They did not receive regular military training, while the regiments organized on a foreign model were trained only one month a year.¹

¹A. Rediger. *Komplektovanie i ustroistvo vooruzhennoi sily*. St. Petersburg, 1900, p. 85.

As a whole, the Russian army before Peter the Great's reforms, was of the nature of militia. There was no conscription in the sense of universal military service before 1705 either in Russia or in any other country of Europe.

The two fundamentals of Peter's conscription law were: (1) all classes of the population were liable for military service, and, (2) communal conscription (*obshchinnaia*) for those who did not belong to the nobility, to be recruited by the communities as before; those recruited under the new law were bound to life-time service (in 1793 the term of service was reduced to twenty-five years). Henceforth, infantry as well as other arms of service were to be recruited from all classes, abolishing the privilege of the nobles to serve only as cavalry. On February 20, 1705, the first call for military service in accordance with the new law was issued. One man was called from every twenty families (*dvory*) in each city, town, and rural district (*uezd*). A total of 167,895 men was recruited from 1705 to 1709, and fully supplied the needs of the army for the campaign of these years. Although eleven more years passed before the treaty of peace with Sweden was signed, military operations were practically at an end after the decisive battle of Poltava (June 27, 1709) and the escape of the defeated Charles XII to Turkey. No necessity for another general call for recruits arose.

In France, although universal military service became law as early as 1798, it remained in force only a very short time. Only after the defeat of France by Germany in 1870-1871, did universal and personal military service become firmly established in the French Republic. It was then clear beyond any doubt that Germany had owed much of her success to the universal conscription law. Let us see in what this system consisted and what were its results.

Following the crushing defeat of Prussia by Napoleon in 1806, great efforts were made by that country to build a strong army. However, it could not be done openly since the strength of the Prussian army had been limited by the Treaty of Tilsit to 42,000 men. In order to increase the strength of the army in time of peace without violating the provision of the treaty, young men were called to serve only for several months, given intensive training, discharged "on leave," and kept on record. Thanks to that method, the so-called *Kruepfer-System*, Prussia in 1813 was able to put into the field an army of 230,000 men consisting of 100,000 regular troops and 130,000 militia (*Landwehr*).²

²A. Rediger, *op. cit.*

In the war of 1813-1814, waged in and outside Germany, both the army and militia participated, accustoming the population of Prussia to the idea that military service is every citizen's duty. As a result, universal and personal military service was established in 1815 for all time. This war also showed that while the original term of active service (ten years) might be shortened, the regular units of the army, in time of war, should be filled out by men with a longer military training than that the militia had. That conclusion was confirmed by wars of later dates (1848-1849, 1859).

The war experience introduced several necessary changes. Prussia's manpower comprised twelve age groups (20-32 years of age) seven of which were made up of well-trained men and the remaining five of militia (*Landwehr*). Of the seven well-trained groups, three included men of active service and four of men transferred to the reserve upon completion of their active service. Young men from 17 to 20 years and older men, between 33 and 42, were also liable for military service in time of war though only for service in the interior of the country. Thanks to this system, which developed reserves of trained men, Germany was able, at the beginning of the Franco-German War on August 1, 1870, to mobilize an army with a strength never before attained by any country. This manpower amounted to 1,183,389 men, of which 692,823 were troops of the field armies, 245,297 troops of second line, and 245,269 troops in garrisons.³

The manpower potential of the French army at that time was derived under very different circumstances. As stated above, universal military service remained in force only a short time after 1798. Passed under the pressure of a great emergency, the law was very unpopular. According to its provisions, the armed forces of France consisted of the standing army and its reserve, the national guard, which served to reinforce the standing army in time of war. Service was to be personal and universal. But, the first of these principles was invalidated as early as 1800 when it was permitted by law to free oneself from military duty either by paying a certain amount of money, or by hiring a substitute. After some time, one-third of the army consisted of substitutes, many of them unreliable from the standpoint of morale. To improve the quality of the army, the practice of using substitutes was discontinued but the freeing from service by payment of money (2,500 francs) was retained. With this money the government hired veterans who had already passed through the ranks of the army, and men of conscription age. As a

³G. A. Leer, *Entsiklopediya voennykh i morskikh nauk*.

result, the French army at the time was neither young nor did it have trained reserves to replace front line casualties.

The Seven Weeks' War of 1866 showed how quickly Germany could put an army of great numerical strength into the field. Two years later, under the obvious influence of the Prussian victory over Austria, the important Niel law (named after Marshal Niel, its author) was enacted in France. The object of the law was to build up trained reserves by transferring to the reserve category for four years soldiers terminating their active service. Furthermore, there was to be formed a second category of reserve (*seconde portion*) from men of draft age who had not been enlisted in the standing army. These were to receive compulsory military training two months a year for three years. Finally, the National Guard, a political organization of no military value whatsoever, was likewise to receive some military training. Had the Niel law been in effect for five or six years, the French army might have had at its disposal a very considerable number of trained reserves, but less than two years had elapsed when the war with Germany broke out. Upon the mobilization of the two opponents, the French found themselves at a great numerical disadvantage. On August 6, 1870, against Germany's army in the field, 692,823 men strong, the French were able to mobilize only 272,623.

In Russia, the principles on which military service had been based by Peter the Great were not continued during the reigns of his successors. The principle of universality was violated when privileges and exemptions from service were granted to the upper classes. This was a concession to the landlords' claim that they were unable to take proper care of their landed estates during long absences. Exemptions were granted then to the merchants, and later to those who either had independent means, higher education, or for one reason or another, stood above the level of the mass of the population. In addition, the inhabitants of certain portions of the country, like Bessarabia and the remote regions of Siberia were altogether freed from service. The extent of these exemptions may be seen from the fact that, according to the 1858 census, 20 percent of the male population of European Russia enjoyed the privilege of being free from military duty.

During the War of 1853-1856 ending with the Crimean campaign, the shocking lack of trained reserves in the Russian army was brought to light. At the beginning of the war the reserve strength estimated to be one-fifth of the army's manpower and consisting of

soldiers who, after twenty years of active service, had been granted "termless" (*bessrochnyi*) leave, proved to be much smaller; many of them, because of ill health, were unfit for service. The war had also made it clear that, in addition to the recruiting system, there were urgently needed reforms relating to the organization and education of the Imperial armed forces.

Fortunately for Russia a man with whose name the liberal reforms in the reign of Alexander II are closely bound was appointed Minister of War in 1861. He was General (later Count) Dimitri Alexeevich Milyutin. Upon receiving military education, Milyutin started his career as an artillery officer, but later, upon graduation from the General Staff College, was transferred to the General Staff Corps and assigned to the Russian army in the Caucasus. There he took part in the fighting for the conquest of that land inhabited by warlike tribes. Some time after his return to St. Petersburg, he became professor in the General Staff College. By that time, he had already won distinction as a military historian, which he owed to his comprehensive history of the Russo-French War of 1799, including the description of the campaigns in Italy and Switzerland of the great Russian captain Suvorov.

As Minister of War, Milyutin started working on a program of detailed improvement of the army and its reserves. This article, however, shall set forth only the activities directly referring to the recruitment and the mobilization of manpower.

In January, 1862, the newly appointed Minister submitted a report to the Emperor stating the fundamentals on which to base the system of recruiting and the reorganization of the army. His main idea was that the defense of the country was the "common task of the people" and that "all, without distinction of class" should unite in that sacred cause.⁴ Consequently, military service should be made compulsory for all classes and individuals alike with no loop holes for substitutes or financial privileges. Such an equal distribution of the heavy burden of military service would lead to the democratization of the army, and could lessen the burden of the poorer classes who almost alone had been subjected to compulsory service during the reigns of the successors to Peter the Great. It is interesting to note that Milyutin was the first to urge the establishing of universal military service at a time when no country in Western Europe, with the exception of Germany, was concerned

⁴Quoted from Alexander II's manifesto establishing conscription, in N. Golovine, *The Russian Army in the World War*, 1931.

with it. Another fundamental army reform was to build up numerous reserves the lack of which was so strongly felt in the last war.

Despite Milyutin's insistence on the urgency of the proposed reforms, it took twelve years to approve his plan in its original form, and begin to implement it. This was hastened under the pressure of international events, in particular the Franco-German War. The universal military service law was enacted January 1, 1874. Certain improvements in the system of recruitment, recommended in the plan, had been made even before that date. As a result, the number of trained reservists had increased within eight years (in 1870) from 210,000 to 553,000.

According to the law of 1874, the armed forces of the country consisted of the standing army with its reserve, and of the territorial army (*opolchenie*) which helped the army in the field in time of war. The entire male population from 21 to 43 was liable for military service, one part in the regular army and its reserve, the other in the *opolchenie*. The duration of military service was 18 years. Those who had completed active service in the standing army (at first, five years, later three years) were transferred for the remaining period of 13 (later 15 years) to the reserve. But, since the number of young men annually reaching conscription age was much higher than the number needed for the army, not all of them could be enlisted for active service. It became necessary to apply the method of selection and to grant exemption from active service to a certain number of men. The physically unfit were freed of course, as was the case in every army, but the granting of exemption to the remaining group was based on a peculiar principle, characteristic of the Russian army alone. It had been a tradition, since Peter the Great, not to deprive a family of its member on whose work that family depended for its living. Accordingly, unconditional exemption was given to only sons and, in general, to anyone who was the only male member in the family capable of work. One can easily see how important that exemption was for the class of the land-tilling peasants. All entitled to it were freed from service both in the army and its reserve, and were directly enrolled in the category of the territorials (*ratniki opolcheniya*).

Thanks to the larger number of trained reserve from this new method, it became possible to put through an important organizational reform, which served to shorten the vulnerable period of mobilization. Instead of increasing the strength of the army in war time by the formation of new units, as formerly, the number of

infantry units was increased although they were maintained in peace time at a reduced strength and filled out with reservists as soon as mobilization was declared.

No less important than the new system of recruiting and the method of mobilization in Milyutin's all-embracing program of army reforms was his plan of improving military education and uplifting the cultural level of the rank-and-file. Milyutin's fundamental idea was that a soldier, in addition to his military training, should also receive general education. These reform measures included the publication of soldiers' magazines (*Chetniya dlya soldat*, *Soldatskaya beseda*), the establishment of soldiers' libraries and soldiers' grammar schools (one in each company or battalion). These measures were of special significance at a time when serfdom had been abolished in Russia and the army was recruited from free men. In a very short time, according to Milyutin's *Memoirs*, it became evident that illiteracy in the army had decreased, and the average mentality of the soldiers stood on a higher level.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 offered an excellent opportunity for the testing of Milyutin's reforms. In November, 1876, the first mobilization in the history of the Russian army took place. Though all the reforms were far from being completed at the time, the mobilization was a success. As early as the fourth day, 75 percent of the 225,000 reservists in ten provinces (*gubernii*) arrived at the assembly points, despite the very inadequate railway facilities and unfavorable weather conditions. By the end of the fourth week all units were filled out with men and horses, and by the end of the seventh week the concentration of troops in the theatre of war was completed. The mobilized army consisted of 28 divisions, 5 brigades, and various auxiliary units.⁵ Eleven years previously, five months had passed before the mobilization of a small number of 67,000 retired soldiers was completed.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the next war in which the Russian army was mobilized in this way. There was no lack of trained reserves for the army at the time, but only Russian forces stationed in Siberia and a few army corps in European Russia were mobilized. To put these on a war footing only a part of the reserves had to be called out. Consequently, the mobilization of troops going to the Far East was accomplished without delay. But at the first important battle of Laoyang (August-September, 1904), there occurred an episode which offered a lesson with regard to the use of

⁵G. A. Leer, *op. cit.*, v. 7, pt. 1, p. 10.

reservists to reinforce the regular units of the army. A brigade under General Orlov, made up almost entirely of reservists (the usual proportion of reservists in an infantry unit was some 50 percent) had been ordered to take up a position on the extreme left flank of the front, at the Yentai coal mines, to serve as a pivot for the general attack that had already started. As the brigade advanced, it was confronted with a Japanese counter-attack and exposed to artillery and machine-gun fire. The reservists turned and fell back in disorder after the commanding general was wounded. The officers were unable to restore order, the general attack was stopped. To complete the story of the Orlov-brigade episode, it must be said in its defense that the older men who composed it had not been called for military drill regularly, their training was far from up-to-date, and they had never been in battle. Obviously, an unseasoned brigade should not have been given such an important assignment.⁶

At the time of the First World War universal military service had been established in all of Europe, with the exception of England. Everywhere the service was based on conscription with the army consisting of a regular peace-time force (except Switzerland where the army was a militia called out in time of emergency only) and reserves. In Russia the conscription law was forty years old, in France it was two years older, and in Italy it was thirty-eight years old. Thus every country had had time enough to build up a numerous reserve with which to fill out the peace-time army. That army in Russia, as the war began, was estimated at 1,423,000 men. The duration of active service was three years, and the period of service in the reserve was fifteen years. However, the reserve consisted not only of the men who had passed through the ranks, but also of those of conscriptive age who were physically fit and not entitled to exemption. Under this program the War Office had eighteen age-groups at its disposal to fill out the units of the standing army and to form new ones in time of war.

Out of the reservoir of manpower of trained reservists, some 3,000,000 men were called to the colors in the first two months of the war,⁷ twice as many as the number of men of the standing army. Even though the number of reservists called in these months trebled the strength of the army, the need for well-trained men was felt so strongly that four age-groups of men who had already passed

⁶M. A. Rossiiskii, *Voenno-istoricheskie primery*, pt. 2, St. Petersburg, 1910.

⁷N. N. Golovine, *The Russian Army in the World War*, Yale University Press, 1931, p. 46.

through both their active and reserve periods of service (42-45 years old) were also called for military service as early as the fifth day of mobilization.

The mobilization of 1914 was considered a complete success. The gathering of reservists at the assembly points, their transportation to the respective army units, the movement of troops to the concentration area, went smoothly according to plan. Satisfaction and praise were expressed by the public and reflected in the press. In recognition of the fine accomplishment of such a highly responsible work the Chief of the Mobilization division of the General Staff was granted a special decoration by the Emperor.

Yet the war was only a few months old when it became apparent that it had not been enough to mobilize just the armed forces in an European war which later became World War I. The most important fact had been disregarded, that a war on a world scale which affected continents and included operations on land, on the seas, and in the air, would unavoidably become a total war. In fact, the fundamental feature of the war of 1914-1918 was its total character. It was total in the sense that it affected every citizen of the country so that not only the country's armed forces but its industry, science, productive capacity had to be mobilized as well. This characteristic of modern warfare along with the rôle of material necessitated a gigantic effort in which all the elements of a nation's physical, mental, and moral power must participate totally if the war is to be waged with some hope of success.

The war has shown beyond any shade of doubt that universal military training in peace time has no substitute.

The recruiting system of the Red Army in World War II, was based on the same principles as that of the old Russian Army. In the early years of the Soviet régime, after much discussion as to the respective advantages of the militia system and a regular army, the final decision favored the latter. Military service was made universal and obligatory by the Constitution of 1936. A most interesting detail of that state act is the terminology stating the importance of military service, since one of the articles of the Constitution uses almost the same words which occurred in Alexander II's manifesto of 1874. In the words of the Soviet Constitution "the defense of the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R."⁸

However, the terms of service, laid down in the Soviet statute, imposed a burden even heavier than that of the old régime. The

⁸D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army*, Princeton, 1944.

draft age was lowered to 19, making the population liable for military service two years earlier, the age limit for the reservists was set at 50 years (it had been 42 according to the old law), military training was made compulsory for all young men of 18 years of age; finally, in 1927, military training was made obligatory in all educational institutions including secondary schools.

The campaigns of 1941-1942 in the Second World War were far from happy for the Soviet Union. They cost the Soviets enormously in terms of human life, material, and territory. Yet, by the end of 1941 the Soviet Command brought reinforcements at a critical time to repulse the German attack that had advanced as far as the immediate neighborhood of Moscow. Unquestionably, the ability of the Soviet Command to weld the large reserve of their militarily trained manpower into cohesive and disciplined units that replaced the millions of killed, wounded, and prisoners turned the scales near Moscow in December, 1941. This was possible because these reserves, thanks to the universal military training, had been familiarized with military discipline, use of weapons, and group action.

Near the end of the last war a weapon was used for the first time, which was so destructive that any further resistance on the part of the opponent became absolutely futile. The question arises whether the use of the atomic bomb, in case of the next emergency, would not invalidate the maintenance of ground forces and, consequently, the system of universal military training and service. In this respect the opinion of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training is of special interest. In the Report made public May 29, 1947, the Commission, outlining the probable war in the foreseeable future, concluded that under the circumstances of such a war, trained men ready and able to meet invasion will be needed "in every part of the country," and that "without Universal Military Training, the Nation's defense would be incomplete and inadequate."⁹

As far as is known, the conscription laws of the Soviet Union and of other European countries (except the defeated ones) have not been invalidated following the last war. They remain in effect now as they were then.

⁹*Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, December, 1947, pp. 35 and 37.

A Yale Man Studies Russian

James Gates Percival (1795-1856) and Russian in New Haven a Century Ago

By MARION MOORE COLEMAN

In the early years of the nineteenth century, before modern languages became, thanks to men like Ticknor and Longfellow, the legitimate and respected branch of study in our universities they are today, there were fellow New Englanders of Ticknor and Longfellow who studied modern languages by themselves as a hobby. Mostly these took up Spanish and German, and of course French, but the Slavonic languages were not wholly neglected. John Quincy Adams, for example, is said to have taught himself Russian, as did John Pickering, the American Indian specialist, who also learned a little Polish. Elihu Burritt, the "learned blacksmith" of New Britain, worked not only at these, but at Czech as well, committing words and idioms to memory as he hammered out brass cowbells on his brother's forge. James Gates Percival learned Russian and Polish and Czech and also Serbian.

Of the labors of Adams and Pickering and Burritt in the Slavic field, no trace remains today beyond the quaint notebooks of Burritt, with their crisp daily progress reports. With Percival, however, the case is different. Although he was by far the least practical of the four we have mentioned, a visionary and an eccentric, Percival was the only one of the New Englanders studying the Slavic languages a century ago to make any contribution, however slight, to the progress of Slavic studies in the United States.

That Percival did leave something behind to show for his labors we have only to glance in Leo Wiener's *Russian Anthology* to see. Of the folk verse given there in translation, three items are by Percival. "The Dove," "The Boyar's Execution," and "The Faithful Lover," are all by him, although credited to Talvj (misspelled Talvi), from whose *History of the Languages and Literature of the Slavs* (N. Y., 1850) Wiener took them. Also, in the volume of Longfellow's *Poems of Places* series devoted to Russia, there is a poem on "The River Moskva" bearing Percival's name as author. This is not, as a matter of fact, an original poem at all, but a trans-

lation ("improvisation" would be a better word) made by Percival from a work by Karamzin.¹ To have given these specimens to two standard reference works is at least something, if not much, on the positive side for Percival.

Percival's studies in Serbian brought him into correspondence with the above-mentioned Talvj,² and his Polish dabbings produced a poem³ often reprinted in American readers of the previous century. What he did with these two languages is well known.⁴ Not so, however, what he did in the Russian field. This, with the aid of the valuable Percival Papers at Yale, we shall set forth here.

James Gates Percival was the son of a country doctor. He was born September 15, 1795, at Kensington, a pleasant rural community near New Britain, Connecticut. After a sketchy schooling, received in part at the school in Wolcott made famous by Bronson Alcott, he was sent to Yale, first to the college (graduated 1815), later the Medical School. At Yale he made a reputation for queerness and an undependable kind of brilliance and was warned by President Dwight that if he failed to take up some "active employment" he would be a "ruined man." Eventually Percival heeded this warning and became a successful geologist, but not until after he had spent two decades and more in aimless study, much of it in the field of languages.⁵

As a boy, Percival did not like languages, preferring, as he wrote, "the Fields of Fiction and Romance." Science interested him, and he liked to lose himself in accounts of travel and exploration. In manhood, however, it was to languages Percival turned, when poetry, which was his first love and by which he aspired to make a living—

¹Based on Karamzin's poem "Kladbishche," which was also translated by Bowring. Percival's improvisation appeared in *The New England Magazine*, Feb. 8, 1835, p. 89, and is also found in Percival's *Dream of a Day*, 1843, pp. 130-131.

²See A. P. Coleman, "Talvj's Correspondence with J. G. Percival," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXII, No. 60, Oct. 1944, pp. 83-96.

³"War Song," originally inspired by lines from Slowacki's *Jan Bielecki*. First published in *The New England Magazine*, Apr. 8, 1835, p. 291, and reprinted into *Dream of a Day*, an anthology of Percival's poems, New Haven, 1843, pp. 140-141. It is in Monroe's *Fifth Reader*, 1871, and in Vol. 11 of Harris and Gilbert's *Poems by Grades* (1907), p. 312, as well as in many other readers, sometimes in abridged form.

⁴For Percival and Polish, see A. P. Coleman, "The Study of Polish in the United States," *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences*, New York, Jan. 1943, pp. 2-5.

⁵The best general work on Percival is Harry R. Warfel's unpublished *Biographic Study*, on file at Yale University.

although no American had ever done such a thing—failed to produce either the remuneration or the substantial glory he required.

It was in 1830, after he had mastered the classical tongues and also the Romance and Germanic, that Percival arrived at Russian. Before starting to study this language specifically, he familiarized himself with the basic principles of the Slavic tongues in general by diligently perusing Adelung's *Mithridates*. Among the Percival Papers are scraps of paper and yellowed copybooks, closely written in Percival's hand with Slavic word lists copied from this great work.

If he had continued with *Mithridates*, and maintained some sort of discipline over himself in his study of Russian, Percival might have accomplished something worthwhile, but as it was, he soon fell into the hands of the superficial John Bowring, and after this nothing could save him from running completely wild. As his first purchase in the field of Russian literature, Percival bought Bowring's *Specimens of the Russian Poets* in October, 1830, from his friend Hezekiah Howe, the New Haven bookseller, for the sum of three dollars and sixty-eight cents.

After Bowring, the next "Russian" book to fall into Percival's hands was an anthology of folk verses in German translation entitled *Stimmen des russischen Volks in Liedern*, by Peter Otto von Goetze (Stuttgart, 1828). Percival found this enticing, as he knew German well and was also fond of music, which Goetze often supplied. From it Percival began to translate with enthusiasm. The three translations mentioned above as having been used by Wiener were from the large number Percival made at this time from the German anthology.

What Percival would have done if there had been no outlet for his translations we can not say, but outlet there was, and a readier one than could be imagined today, in the local newspapers. From April 27, 1832 on, we find translations from Goetze appearing in quantities in the semi-weekly *New Haven Advertiser* and later in its weekly edition, *The Connecticut Journal*. Twenty in all appeared, some quite long. The chance to publish led Percival to fill every scrap of paper he could lay his hands on with "Excerpts from the Slavonic," as he called them. Many of these eventually found their way into print, more did not.

Just what books in Russian Percival bought for himself we cannot tell, as no one was able to read the language and in the catalog of his library all are lumped together in a single item, No. 2910, "Works in Russian." We do know, however, that he had Krylov's

Basni (1819 ed.) and that this was probably the very first Russian book to be purchased by him. He got it from the Boston bookseller George Burdett, in January, 1834, at the same time as he bought a short grammatical work by Nicholas Grech.⁶

In April, 1834, Percival received from Burdett an interesting list of available Russian items, which the dealer was willing to supply at cost plus ten percent if Percival would take the entire lot, cost plus twenty percent if he made a selection.

On receiving Burdett's list, Percival did not, as previously he had done with a Polish list from the same firm, sit down at once and dispatch an order for the lot. This time, perhaps because he had been somewhat cheated before, with masses of propaganda material of no value in his studies, he made a careful selection, ordering only seven items.⁷ Nor did he send his order right away, but waited until he had money due him in Boston from *The New England Magazine*, in payment for various sonnets on Slavonic themes. Then he asked his friend Samuel Gridley Howe to apply the money which was owed him to the Burdett bill. This was actually paid not by Howe but by Park Benjamin,⁸ who succeeded Howe as editor of *The New England Magazine* in the spring of 1835.

A second Boston dealer to assist Percival in the building of a Russian collection was the firm of Crocker and Brewster, from whom he bought Vater's *Grammatik der russischen Sprache*⁹ (Leipzig, 1814-15, 2 vols. in 1) in the autumn of 1834. How many other booksellers of the time there were who had a part in his library we do not know, except for William Gowan (s) of New York. From him Percival bought, in December, 1835, Ivan Heym's *Deutsch-russisch-französisches Taschenwörterbuch*¹⁰ (Riga-Leipzig, 1805, 1 vol.). Where he

⁶*Nachalnyya pravila russkoi grammatiki* St. Petersburg, 1828.

⁷The books ordered by Percival may be identified as:

Ivan Heym, *Dictionnaire complet russe-français-allemand*, Moscow, 1826, 4 vols.

Nicholas Grech, *Grammaire raisonnée de la langue russe*, St. Petersburg, 1829, 2 vols.

Nicholas Grech, *Prakticheskaya russkaya grammatika*, St. Petersburg, 1827, 1 vol.

Key to Grech, *Prakticheskaya grammatika*.

Nicholas Grech, *Poezdka v Germaniyu*, St. Petersburg, 1831, 2 vols.

Anna Bunina, *Sobranie stikhotvorenii*, St. Petersburg, 1819-1821, 3 vols.

What the 7th item, "Collection of Prosaical Works (en Russe)" could have been, we have no way of knowing.

⁸See letter of Benjamin, Mar. 27, 1835, among the Percival Papers.

⁹He paid a dollar and a quarter for this. See bill, in the Percival Papers. Bill dated Sept. 10, 1834.

¹⁰Gowan charged him three dollars. See bill of Dec. 24, 1835, in the Percival Papers.

got the copy of Tappé's *Theoretisch-praktische russische Sprachlehre* (1812) which we know he had, and which he learned about from Bowring, we do not know.

Before Percival came to the point of studying the Russian language, he was obliged, in connection with various literary hack jobs which he undertook in order to keep body and soul together to do a great deal of general reading on Russia. Naturally he had access to the Library of Yale, but this was not the same as having a library of his own, and whenever he had a few dollars in his pocket he would spend them on books, ordering these, as far as he could, from his friend Howe.¹¹

As with everyone who translates into English from the Russian, Percival had a hard struggle over transliteration. In addition to the scraps of paper attesting to this, which we have waded through in the collection at Yale, there are printed evidences to prove that from the first Percival found the problem baffling.

From his treatment of three lines taken from Karamzin's poem "Kladbishche" which Percival used to caption the first of the *Slavonia* Sonnets published in *The New England Magazine*, one can see that the scheme of transliteration employed by him in the beginning was to all intents and purposes that of his master John Bowring and was based on English orthography but with some German influences apparent.

To Percival's credit, it must be said that he was not satisfied with

¹¹In his library, at the time of his death, were the following works in the general field of Russian (according to the catalog of Percival's Library, when it was sold in 1859):

James Burney, *Chronological History of the Northeastern Voyages of Discovery and of the Early Navigations of the Russians*, London, 1819.

Henry Card, *History of the Revolutions of Russia*, London, 1803.

J. H. Castéra, *Life of Catherine II, Empress of Russia*, London, 1798-9 (Tooke's translation).

E. D. Clarke, *Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa*, Philadelphia, 1811, 4 vols.

Same, New York, 1815.

Capt. John Dundas Cochrane, *Pedestrian Journey through Russia and Siberian Tartary*, 1820-1823, Phila., 1824.

A. G. Coutant-Dorville, *Fastes de la*

Pologne et de la Russie, Paris, 1770, 2 vols.

James Motley, *Life of Peter I, Emperor of Russia*, London, 1739, 2 vols.

L'Abbé Perin, *Abrégé de l'Histoire de Russie*, Paris, 1818, 2 vols.

Same, *Peter III and Catherine II of Russia, History of Their Reigns*, London, 1798, 2 vols.

Sir R. T. Wilson, *Russia: Sketch of her Military and Political Power in 1817*, N. Y., 1817.

P. P. de Segur, *History of Russia and Peter the Great*, London, 1829.

Andrew Swinton, *Travels in Norway, Denmark and Russia, 1788-1791*, Dublin, 1792.

Bowring's scheme. He continued to experiment, hoping to hit on a better system, and as he did so he kept noticing in the daily papers evidences that, however poor his own method might be, the systems used by others were even worse. Often he would charge into the offender in Letters to the Editor, signing himself "*shchet.*" The special objects of his wrath were those who "obtained their Russian words from French sources, "among these the temperance worker and traveller Robert Baird (1798-1863), a clergyman who wrote a series of letters from Russia for the *Advertiser* (New York) in 1837 under the pseudonym "Americanus." A single sample will suffice to show Percival's line in attacking the Bairds of his day:

. . . Americanus, in a course of very interesting letters from Russia, informs us that the Russian peasant's *pelisse* (sheepskin coat) is called *chouba*, and then proceeds to state with grave circumstantiality that *ch* must be pronounced as our *ch* in *church*, *ou* as our *oo* in *choose*, and as our *a* in *father*. The last two are correct, the first is wrong. *Chouba* is the French orthography. An Englishman or an American who knew the Russian language would write the word from the Russian letters *shooba*; an Italian *sciuba*, and only a Frenchman *chouba*. . . .¹²

Percival wrestled long with the problem and at the end was not so well off as in the beginning, for here we find him falling into an even more ridiculous system than the one used by Mr. Baird. What Percival did was to follow a system based not on English orthography, but on Polish! This seems incredible, but Percival tells us in his introduction to his translation of Derzhavin's *Bog* that Polish spelling seemed to him to offer—of all things—"the best possibility of avoiding an unsightly display of consonants."¹³ This, we may add, seems no more absurd than to base a system on Czech orthography, as some in the United States are doing today.

Although Percival made a name as a translator of Slavonic verse, he did not, in fact, do a great deal of genuine translation. As we have said, he generally improvised, rather than translated, following in this technique widely practiced in his day, even by well known poets like Thomas Moore.

Neither the *Slavonia* Sonnets, previously referred to, nor the *Slavonic Excerpts* which appeared from Percival's pen in the *New Haven Herald* in 1840, based on poems of Karamzin, Delvig, Dmitriev, and Schulepnikov, were translations in the strict sense of

¹²New Haven Daily Herald, November 28, 1837.

¹³See *The Church Chronicle*, March 7, 1841, or Julius H. Ward, *Life and Letters of James Gates Percival*, Boston, 1866, p. 574.

the word, but poems by Percival himself, composed under the inspiration of lines by the various Russians. Only in the single case of Derzhavin's *Bog* do we find Percival giving us a complete and genuine translation from a Russian original.

Percival was introduced to this poem by Bowring, and translated it himself because Bowring's translation (in *Specimens of the Russian Poets*) failed to satisfy him. He called Bowring's version a paraphrase, rather than a translation, "less direct and impressive" than the Russian, as well as "inflated and declamatory." He admits that his own, while more literal than Bowring's, also falls far short of the great, and, as he says, majestic original. A comparison of the three versions, Derzhavin's original, Bowring's translation and Percival's bears out Percival's statement that his version is, indeed, far closer to the Russian than Bowring's.

When Percival first began the translation of Russian verse, he did so with the aid of a German intermediary, as we have seen, and at the end of his labors was conscious of a sense of satisfaction. As he wrote George Ticknor, he felt he had made from the primitive Russian verses, English verses of corresponding simplicity and primitive appeal, through a device which he had hit on using mostly Anglo-Saxon words.

No such simple formula worked, however, when Percival advanced to the works of inspired poets. His writings, whether published or in manuscript, are filled with frustration, as Percival finds himself completely unable to tailor the highly inflected forms of the Russian to the terse, often spondaic measures of English. At the end of nearly fifteen years of trying to translate successfully from the Russian, we find him giving up, and admitting in the introduction to his version of Derzhavin's poem, that the task on which he once set out so hopefully is an impossible one. There is no such thing as a successful translation from the Russian, at any rate from Russian poetry. The abyss dividing the two languages is too great. Any translation, if a good poem, is no translation at all but a totally new poem. In this Percival found justification for his own early improvisations.

Percival, in his study of the Russian language and literature, was an almost unreal figure, without ancestors or kinsmen or descendants on this continent. Perhaps if he had been at Harvard, with Ticknor to discipline and encourage, he might have achieved something, but at Yale the climate was wrong. Science was in the ascendancy, and modern languages undreamed of as a branch of

serious study. It is a pity this was so and that one who was willing to spend so much effort on language study could not have been saved for professional work in the language field. It is to be regretted that he had to follow the procedure so easy for Americans of "taking a job," and leaving the field to others, living on the other side of the water in a more favorable intellectual climate. The trouble was, of course, that Percival was no "maker of manners," and that he had neither the vision nor will nor toughness of the pioneer. Worst of all, he had no proper training, nor was any to be come by in the United States at the time he lived. As a result, although Percival dabbled long in Russian language and literature, our knowledge of these was scarcely advanced at all for his having done so.

Soviet Agriculture and the Fourth Five-Year Plan

By N. JASNY

By the end of World War II the agricultural output of the Soviet Union had been reduced by probably 40%. Russian territories overrun by the enemy were greatly devastated by the Nazi, who were particularly ruthless in Russia, while the specific form of Soviet agriculture, the collective farms, began to fall apart with the retreat of the Soviet administration. However, these farms were not completely dissolved. The Germans were quick to see the great advantages of collective farms as instruments of pumping farm produce from the population.

During the war, and some time after its end, the Soviets insisted that agricultural output in the territories not occupied by the enemy increased greatly during the war. In reality, agriculture there suffered a collapse at the first shot. The 1945 level of output in those territories may already have represented a certain recovery from the bottom reached probably in 1943. Yet the decline in farm output of the territories under Soviet control in 1945 was only a little less than that of all Soviet agriculture in present boundaries, amounting to less than 70% of the prewar level.

Under these conditions, the goal of the Fourth Five-Year Plan to exceed in 1950 the 1940 gross agricultural output by 27%, that is, to roughly double the 1945 output, seems extraordinarily ambitious. This goal appears particularly unattainable when one considers the meager provisions for the Plan's fulfillment.

The Soviet population experienced great deprivation during the war. Older people, unable to work hard, were simply sacrificed, and the death rate must have been extremely high (not a word has been uttered on this topic). Those naive enough to expect an all-out campaign for the restoration of food output after the war were due for a great disappointment.

Shortage of horse power was an important factor in the great decline of farm output during the war. Some of the farm tractors and horses were drafted for war, never to be returned. Practically all of the remaining tractors became obsolete because of age, poor

repairs, and incompetent handling. In 1945 horse power on farms was less than 70% of prewar figures. Now the goal of 15.3 million horses by 1950 seems impossible of achievement, hence the agricultural recovery in the Soviet Union must be based primarily on the rehabilitation of tractor power.

Two of the three large prewar tractor factories (at Stalingrad and Kharkov) were destroyed during the war. Yet even a partial re-conversion of the third and largest tractor plant (at Chelyabinsk) from tanks to tractors was not started until 1946. This factory which turned out 11,600 tractors in 1938 produced only about 550 tractors in 1946 and was scheduled to produce 3,800 tractors in 1947. Moreover, these were 80 horsepower tractors which, though too large for efficient use on farms, could easily be converted into large tanks.

The total tractor output of 1946 was approximately 13,000 tractors, 3.7% of the five-year goal. Many have been misled by the official boast that tractor output grew by 109% in 1947. The roughly 28,000 tractors produced in that year were far short of the numbers that would normally be discarded in one year.¹ The output of other machinery was correspondingly small in the first two postwar years. The deficiency in mechanization of farm operations was present as late as 1948. Most of the hay, for example, still had to be cut by hand last summer.

Large-scale production of farm machinery is scheduled only for the later years of the Plan. If, contrary to the practice of 1946 and 1947, when the small goals of the plans for farm machinery were not achieved, the goals of 1948 through 1950 are met, the Soviet Union will have by and large recovered her losses in farm machinery. Horse power will, however, be developed by large tractors to a much greater extent, although operations such as haying and cultivation will probably require more manual labor than before the war.

Cotton and sugar beets have always received particular attention in the U. S. S. R. This may partly explain the ambitious goal for the output of commercial fertilizer in 1950 (almost 60% above prewar) and the immediate expansion of its output since the war. Practically none was produced during the war. Although, as usual, the 1950 goal may not be reached, the prewar level will certainly be substantially exceeded by 1950.

Most of the people drafted into the armed forces during the war came from farms and women, whose day was already well filled with work, became the main source of farm labor; children and old folks

¹For details see writer's "Guns before Bread," *The New Leader*, November 15, 1947, pp. 5 and 15.

filled in the gaps. Yet the government has been very slow in demobilizing the army. The relatively few released in 1945 and 1946 were absorbed mostly by the cities. By the spring of 1947, the shortage of farm labor was considerably relieved by returning soldiers but it did not disappear. Absence of any data on farm population, farm labor, or population in general excludes the possibility of definite conclusions on this topic.

The willingness, or lack of it, of the peasants to work for collective farms will control the rate of recovery. During the war compulsion was a major factor of insuring work. In 1942 the minimum work to be performed for the collective farms by their members was raised from 80 *trudodni*² to 120 in the principal agricultural areas. A minimum of 50 *trudodni* was simultaneously introduced for children from 12 to 16 years of age. All other people in villages and cities were also mobilized for farm work. To ensure farm labor by compulsion was, however, not a wartime measure in the Soviet Union. The compulsory minimum of *trudodni* to be earned by each able-bodied peasant of either sex was introduced by the government and Party order of May 27, 1939. Indirect compulsory measures were simultaneously introduced, such as limiting the land and livestock holdings of the *kolkhoz* peasants. As a result of this policy in 1939-40 the peasants lost a substantial proportion of their land holdings and a portion of their livestock.

These measures thus far have not been relaxed. The measures compelling the peasants to work for their collective farms have likewise been maintained. The large compulsory deliveries of livestock, which are independent of ownership, are automatically preventing the rehabilitation of livestock herds. The government and Party order of September 19, 1946, was intended to eliminate any "unlawful" increase in the land holdings of the *kolkhoz* peasants which had occurred during the war.

It was realized, however, that compulsion alone does not solve the problem. The unwillingness of the peasants to work for the collective farms increased during the war as their rewards decreased. This lessened willingness undoubtedly accentuated the farm labor shortage in the first postwar years. Hence, while there was no relaxation in the measures intended to force the peasants to work for their farms, there was a constant outpouring of government and Party orders intended to increase the desire of the peasants to work. Better payment of the *kolkhoz* and other farm workers is the aim

²*Trudoden* is a unit in which the work of the peasants is measured. A workday was equivalent to about $1\frac{1}{3}$ *trudodni* in 1938.

of these orders. Better payment, consisting partly of more *trudodni* for more work performed during the same period of time, but mostly of premiums in kind for the attainment of yields in excess of respective goals, tries to achieve this end. The number of persons entitled to premiums was gradually extended from those directly performing an operation to everybody remotely connected with the work.

Measures of this kind, while dating from prewar times, have been greatly expanded since the war. Their weakness lies in the fact that these measures do not remove the principal cause of the small payments of the *kolkhoz* peasants and, consequently, of the poor quality of their work—the large compulsory deliveries to the state at low or token prices. The total agricultural output is but slightly increased by premiums. Their principal effect is to redistribute the small total amount of produce and money among the collective farmers, after the state has received its large share. While the interest of a certain group to work for the farm may be raised by the premium system, the interest of the others may be dampened even more.³

The compulsory deliveries of farm products to the state will probably rise less rapidly than the total farm output in the next few years. The labor input, on the other hand, will not need to increase substantially because of the availability of more machinery. The payment for the labor of the collective farmers is therefore likely to rise. But in the predictable future it will reach at best the low and unsatisfactory prewar level, which was the principal reason for the poor work and necessitated the compulsive measures.

With such prospects for the supply of horse power, machinery, and labor, and with the doubtful willingness of the *kolkhoz* peasants to work, the 1950 goal to increase the farm output by 27% over the 1940 level, is obviously absurd. As far as animal products are concerned, the propagation limitations must be considered. A hundred breedable cows average less than 100 calves per year and it takes three years before a calf yields milk, in a socialist state just the same as in a capitalist state.

So far as one can judge from the few details given in the Fourth Five-Year Plan, its goals, even if realized, would represent a smaller increase than 27%. The figure for the value of total agricultural production in 1940 (23 billion rubles at 1926-27 prices) probably pertains to a territory smaller than the present one. Moreover, in the Soviet Union crops are estimated before harvesting, although the unharvested portions of the crops are included in the gross agri-

³For some details on the shortcomings of the collective farms see writer's "The Plight of the Collective Farms," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXX, 1948, pp. 304-21.

cultural production figures. The goal for the 1950 gross agricultural production has apparently been padded by these unharvested portions. Since the figure of 23 billion rubles for the 1940 gross agricultural output was given without any subdivisions of commodities or areas, it is impossible to say by how much it would have to be increased to make it comparable with the 1950 goal of 29 billion rubles.

Even with the needed adjustments, the 1950 goal for the total agricultural output exceeds the 1940 output. But unfulfillable goals for agricultural output have become a tradition of Soviet planning. The First Five-Year Plan showed a substantial decline instead of the scheduled large increase, only about half of the increase planned for the Second materialized, and the prewar portion of the Third, was one of practical stagnation in agricultural output, although the Plan asked for a 50% increase.

With respect to individual crops, the Fourth Five-Year Plan contains specific data only for five products: grain, sugar beets, flax, cotton, and sunflower. The Plan provides for a grain output of 127 million metric tons. The 1940 grain crop was calculated by S. F. Demidov,⁴ vice-president of the Gosplan, at 118.8 million tons, but this figure probably refers to a territory smaller than the present one. Thus the expected increase in grain output over the prewar level is only a few per cent. In accordance with a prewar policy of replacing part of the grain acreage by sown grasses, the grain acreage scheduled for 1950 is smaller than that of 1940 by several million hectares. The planned increase in total output is, therefore, small in spite of the optimistic expectation of higher yields. The average grain yield scheduled for 1950, 12 quintals per hectare on the root, exceeds that of 1940 by almost 10%.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan calls for 26 million tons of sugar beets in 1950, an increase of more than 30% over that of prewar. The 1950 goal for the sugar output (2.4 million tons), however, is only at the prewar level. Since a decision to start using sugar beets for feed on a large scale has not been announced, it is obvious that a large discount was made in the 1950 goal for sugar beets for the losses of the beets in the field. The data on sugar-beet acreage and sugar output indicate that the Fourth Five-Year Plan actually provides for lower yields of sugar beets in 1950 than in prewar years.

Absence of evidence makes analysis impossible for the three other crops, but substantial increases are not scheduled for any of them.

The expected output for such an important crop as potatoes is not

⁴*Development of Agriculture in the Postwar Five-Year Period*, Moscow, 1946, p. 14.

stated. Even the planned potato acreage is not given separately. The Soviets are reluctant to discuss potato production because such a discussion might disclose that the above-mentioned decree of May 27, 1939, led to a substantial decline of potato growing by the *kolkhoz* peasants in 1940. These peasants were also prevented from growing as many potatoes as they wanted during the war, a policy which has continued. Data on acreages in "potatoes and vegetables" given together for the individual republics indicate that an increase in potato acreage of approximately 10% is expected as compared to 1938. Since a reduced acreage is probably planned for the collective farmers, the scheduled increase in the potato acreage of the farms must be 40%, a practical impossibility considering the probable labor supply in 1950. No definite figures can be found in the Plan or other literature on the potato yield predicted for 1950, but indirect indications, such as hog numbers, point to a moderate figure.

The 1945 acreage in perennial grasses amounted to only one-half of the 1940 level. In spite of the prospective shortage of labor in 1950 and the probable lack of urgent need for additional hay, the Plan provides for more than doubling of the 1940 acreage in perennial grasses. This is one of the divergencies of the national botanical school of Williams-Lysenko from the opinions held abroad.⁵ According to this school, perennial grasses grown for one or two years in rotation with other crops in areas with inadequate precipitation have greater merits than the long-time experience of similar areas in this country and Canada ascribes to them.

Below is given a rough comparison of the livestock herds planned for the beginning of 1951 with those for the beginnings of 1938, 1941, and 1946 (in million heads):⁶

Year	Horses	Cattle	Hogs	Sheep and Goats
Jan. 1, 1938	20.2	59.4	32.2	73.6
1941	21.3	55.1	28.2	91.8
1946	10.5	47.0	10.4	69.4
1951	15.3	65.3	31.2	121.5

⁵Recently the school, whose stand has the blessing of the Party, succeeded in eradicating the large group of dissenting scholars. Nemchinov, the director of the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, lost his job. Although a Communist from way back, he permitted some independence of opinion in his Academy.

⁶The figures for all livestock in 1946 and 1951 and for the 1938 and 1941 herds in pre-1939 territories are official; the 1938 and 1941 herds in the new territories are estimated by the writer.

The decline in cattle and hogs in 1938-1940 was due to the attack on the private holdings of *kolkhoz* peasants. The Fourth Five-Year Plan wants to increase the number of cattle by about 10% over 1938 and the planned increase in cow numbers is apparently of the same degree, although a certain lag is inevitable. An even greater increase than for cattle is expected for sheep and goats. Hog numbers in 1950, however, are planned at slightly below those in 1938. This is not due to the physical impossibility of achieving greater increases in the hog numbers, but probably reflects doubts that the grain and potato supplies will permit a larger number of hogs. The Plan possibly expects an export of grain.

The most unrealistic part of the agricultural provisions of this plan is the demand to have the average milk yield raised by 67% over the 1945 level. According to Andreev, the Politbureau member in charge of agriculture, the 1945 average milk yield amounted to 945 kilograms and the yield planned for 1950 is 1,578 kilograms which would be 40% to 45% above prewar production. Nothing in farm organization, crops grown, availability of concentrated feed, and the like is scheduled to happen that could justify the expectation of such a jump. The stated percentage figure for the increase in milk yield is the only specific information on the output of animal products given in the Plan.

During the expired portion of the Fourth Five-Year Plan period inclusive of 1948, sown acreages apparently were expanding according to schedule, but with important exceptions (potatoes, sown grasses, and some other crops). The goals for the yields and output were apparently not reached. Only a fraction of the scheduled increases in livestock herds has materialized. Crop production is likely to be measurably below prewar figures in 1950; the lag will be large in animal products. This can be estimated from unbiased statistics. The Soviet "accounting" doubtlessly will show a much more optimistic picture.⁷

⁷By replacing in the name of the Central Statistical Office, the term statistics with accounting, the claim was made that under the Soviets statistics are more exact than in the capitalist world. Actually Soviet statistics are not only becoming increasingly scarce, now reaching almost the vanishing point, but starting as far back as 1930 they have been increasingly distorted. With this statement the writer goes on record as a non-serious student. According to Alexander Gershenkron, formerly of the Federal Reserve System and now at Harvard University: "Serious students of the Russian economy agree that the Russian practice is to withhold certain statistical information rather than to falsify it." (See *The Review of Economic Statistics*, XXIX, 1947, p. 217.)

Leo Tolstoy's "A History of Yesterday"

TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN

By GEORGE L. KLINE

Translator's Note: "A History of Yesterday" (*Istoriya vcherashnego dnya*) was written in 1851, set aside by Tolstoy while he worked on "Childhood," and never taken up again. It was not published until after his death, and was never translated into English. The text which I used for the present translation is that of the authoritative Jubilee Edition (vol. I, Moscow, 1935), edited by Chertkov. Professor Simmons writes of the work as follows: "It is a considerable fragment of what was intended to be a long work under the title of *A History of Yesterday*. In its present form the fragment embraces a detailed description of an actual evening he spent in the home of Prince and Princess Volkonski (Tolstoy was much attracted to the wife, Princess L. Volkonski, who served as the model for the "Little Princess," wife of Andrei Bolkonski, in *War and Peace*), which he eventually intended to subordinate to a larger design. This fragment is a unique performance for a beginner. In its infinite detail, concerned largely with a minute analysis of his conscious and subconscious thoughts and feelings reacting to particular situations, the work has the distinct flavor of Proust and Joyce. The immediate model, however, was Sterne, whose influence is clear in the frequent digressions, in the mixture of trivial observation with commonplace aphorisms, and in the transformation of all the unexpected and confused associations of thought that enter the hero's head as he falls asleep. The young Tolstoy reveled in his newly discovered powers of analysis, but this exuberant abandon never again appeared in his fiction." (*Leo Tolstoy*, p. 72.)

I AM writing a history of yesterday not because yesterday was extraordinary in any way, for it might rather be called ordinary, but because I have long wished to trace the intimate side of life through an entire day. Only God knows how many diverse and diverting impressions, together with the thoughts awakened by them, occur in a single day. Obscure and confused they may be, but they are nevertheless comprehensible to our minds. If it were possible for me to recount them all so that I myself could read the tale with ease and so that others might read it as I do, a most instructive and amusing book would result; nor would there be ink enough in the world to write it, or typesetters to put it in print. But to get on with the story.

I arose late yesterday—at a quarter to ten—because I had retired

after twelve. (I have long since made a rule never to retire after twelve, yet this happens to me at least three times a week.) But there are circumstances in which I consider this rather a fault than a crime. These circumstances are of various kinds; yesterday they were as follows:

Here I must apologize for going back to the day before yesterday. But then, novelists write whole stories about their heroes' forebears.

I was playing cards; not at all from a passion for the game, as it might seem; no more, indeed, from a passion for the game than one who dances the polka does so from a passion for promenading. Rousseau among other things which he proposed and no one has accepted, suggested the playing of cup-and-ball in society in order to keep the hands occupied. But that is scarcely enough; in society the head too should be occupied, or at the very least should be so employed as to allow silence equally with conversation. Such an employment has been invented: cards. People of the older generation complain that "nowadays there is no conversation." I do not know how people were in the old days (it seems to me that people have always been the same), but conversation there can never be. As an employment conversation is the stupidest of inventions.—It is not from a deficiency of intelligence but from egotism that conversation fails. Everyone wishes to talk about himself or about that which interests him; however, if one speaks and another listens, the result is not a conversation but a lecture. And if two people come together who are interested in the same thing, then a third person is enough to spoil the whole business: he interferes, you must try to give him a share too—and your conversation has gone to the devil.

There are also conversations between people who are interested in the same thing, and where no one disturbs them, but such cases are even worse. Each speaks of the same thing from his own viewpoint, transposing everything to his own key, and measuring everything with his own yardstick. The longer the conversation continues, the farther apart they draw, until at last each one sees that he is no longer conversing, but is preaching with a freedom which he permits only to himself; that he is making a spectacle of himself, and that the other is not listening to him, but is doing the same thing. Have you ever rolled eggs during Holy Week? You start off two identical eggs with the same stick, but with their little ends on opposite sides. At first they roll in the same direction, but then each one begins to roll away in the direction of its little end. In conversation as in egg-rolling, there are little sloops that roll along noisily

and not very far; there are sharp-ended ones that wander off heaven knows where. But, with the exception of the little sloops, there are no two eggs that would roll in the same direction. Each has its little end.

I am not speaking now of those conversations which are carried on simply because it would be improper not to say something, just as it would be improper to appear without a necktie. One person thinks, "You know quite well that I have no real interest in what I am saying, but it is necessary"; and the other, "Talk away, talk away, poor soul—I know it is necessary." This is not conversation, but the same thing as a swallowtail coat, a calling card, and gloves—a matter of *décorum*.

And that is why I say that cards are an excellent invention. In the course of the game one may chat, gratify one's ego, and make witty remarks; furthermore, one is not obliged to keep to the same subject, as one is in that society where there is only conversation.

One must reserve the last intellectual cartridge for the final round, when one is taking his leave: then is the time to explode your whole supply, like a race horse approaching the finish line. Otherwise one appears pale and insipid; and I have noticed that people who are not only clever but capable of sparkling in society have lost out in the end because they lacked this sense of timing. If you have spoken heatedly and then, because of weariness and boredom, you cannot muster a reply, the last impression lingers and people say, "How dull he is. . . ." But when people play cards this does not happen. One may remain silent without incurring censure.

Besides, women—young ones—play cards, and what could be better than to sit beside a young lady for two or three hours? And if it is *the* young lady, nothing more can be desired.

And so I played cards. We took seats on the right, on the left, opposite—and everything was cozy.

This diversion continued until a quarter to twelve. We finished three rubbers. Why does this woman love (how I should like to finish this sentence here with "me"!) to embarrass me?—For even if she didn't I would not be myself in her presence. It seems to me either that my hands are very dirty, or that I am sitting awkwardly, or else a pimple on my cheek—the one facing her—torments me. Yet she is in no way to blame for this: I am always ill at ease with people whom I either do not like or like very much. Why is this? Because I wish to convey to the former that I do not like them, and to the latter that I do, and to convey what you wish is very difficult.

With me it always works out in reverse. I wish to be cool, but then this coolness seems overdone and I become too affable. With people whom you love honorably, the thought that they may think you love them dishonorably unnerves you and you become short and brusque.

She is the woman for me because she has all those endearing qualities which compel one to love them, or rather, to love her—for I do love her. But not in order to possess her. That thought never entered my head.

She has the bad habit of billing and cooing with her husband in front of others, but this does not bother me; it would mean no more to me if she should kiss the stove or the table. She plays with her husband as a swallow plays with a blossom, because she is warm-hearted and this makes her happy.

She is a coquette; no, not a coquette, but she loves to please, even to turn heads. I won't say coquette, because either the word or the idea associated with it is bad. To call showing the naked body and deceiving in love coquetry!—That is not coquetry but brazen impudence and baseness. But to wish to please and to turn heads is fine and does no one any harm, since there are no Werthers, and it provides innocent pleasure for oneself and others. Thus, for example, I am quite content that she should please me; I desire nothing more. Furthermore, there is clever coquetry and stupid coquetry: clever coquetry is inconspicuous and you do not catch the culprit in the act; stupid coquetry, on the contrary, hides nothing. It speaks thus: "I am not so good-looking, but what legs I have! Look! Do you see? What do you say? Nice?"—Perhaps your legs are nice, but I did not notice, because you showed them.—Clever coquetry says: "It is all the same to me whether you look or not. I was hot, so I took off my hat." I saw everything. "And what does it matter to me?" *Her* coquetry is both innocent and clever.

I looked at my watch and got up. It is astonishing: except when I am speaking to her, I never see her looking at me, and yet she sees all my movements.—"Oh, what a pink watch he has!" I am very much offended when people find my Bréguet watch pink; it would be equally offensive if they told me that my vest is pink. I suppose I was visibly embarrassed, because when I said that on the contrary it was an excellent watch, she became embarrassed in her turn. I dare say she was sorry that she had said something which put me in an awkward position. We both sensed the humor of the situation, and smiled. Being embarrassed together and smiling together

was very pleasant to me. A silly thing, to be sure, but together.—I love these secret, inexplicable relationships, expressed by an imperceptible smile or by the eyes. It is not that one person understands the other, but that each understands that the other understands that he understands him, etc.

Whether she wished to end this conversation which I found so sweet, or to see how I would refuse, or if I would refuse, or whether she simply wished to continue playing, she looked at the figures which were written on the table, drew the chalk over the table—making a figure that could be classified neither as mathematical nor pictorial—looked at her husband, then between him and me, and said: "Let's play three more rubbers." I was so absorbed in the contemplation not of her movements alone, but of everything that is called *charme*—which it is impossible to describe—that my imagination was very far away, and I did not have time to clothe my words in a felicitous form. I simply said: "No, I can't."

Before I had finished saying this I began to regret it,—that is, not all of me, but one part of me. There is no action which is not condemned by some part of the mind. On the other hand, there is a part that speaks in behalf of any action: what is so bad about going to bed after twelve, and when do you suppose you will spend another such delightful evening?—I dare say this part spoke very eloquently and persuasively (although I cannot convey what it said), for I became alarmed and began to cast about for arguments.—In the first place, I said to myself, there is no great pleasure in it, you do not like her at all, and you're in an awkward position; besides, you've already said that you can't stay, and you would fall in her estimation. . . .

"Comme il est aimable, ce jeune homme."

This sentence, which followed immediately after mine, interrupted my reflections.—I began to make excuses, to say I couldn't stay, but since one does not have to think to make excuses, I continued reasoning with myself.

. . . How I love to have her speak of me in the third person. In German this is rude, but I would love it even in German. Why doesn't she find a decent name for me? It is clearly awkward for her to call me either by my given name or by my surname and title. Can this be because I . . .

"Stay for supper," said her husband.—As I was busy with my reflections on the formula of the third person, I did not notice that my body, while very properly making its excuses that it could not

stay, was putting down its hat again and sitting down quite coolly in an easy chair. It was clear that my mind was taking no part in this absurdity. I became highly vexed and was about to begin roundly reproaching myself, when a pleasant circumstance diverted me. She very carefully drew something which I could not see, lifted the chalk a little higher than was necessary, and placed it on the table. Then she put her hands on the divan on which she was sitting and, wiggling from side to side, pushed herself to the back of it and raised her head—her little head, with the fine rounded contours of her face, the dark, half-closed, but energetic eyes, the narrow, sharp little nose and the mouth that was one with the eyes and always expressed something new. At this moment who could say what it expressed? There was pensiveness and mockery, and pain, and a desire to keep from laughing, dignity, and capriciousness, and intelligence, and stupidity, and passion, and apathy, and much more. After waiting for a moment, her husband went out—I suppose to order the supper.

To be left alone with her is always frightening and oppressive to me. As I follow with my eyes whoever is leaving, it is as painful to me as the fifth figure of the quadrille: I see my partner going over to the other side and I must remain alone. I am sure it was not so painful for Napoleon to see the Saxons crossing over to the enemy at Waterloo as it was for me in my early youth to watch this cruel maneuver. The stratagem that I employ in the quadrille I employed also in this case: I acted as though I did not notice that I was alone. And now even the conversation which had begun before his exit came to an end; I repeated the last words that I had said, adding only, "And that's how it is." She repeated hers, adding, "Yes." But at the same time another, inaudible, conversation began.

She: "I know why you repeat what you have already said. It is awkward for you to be alone and you see that it is awkward for me,—so in order to seem occupied you begin to talk. I thank you very much for this attention, but perhaps one could say something a little bit more intelligent."

I: "That is true, your observation is correct, but I don't know why *you* feel awkward. Is it possible that you think that when you are alone I will begin to say things that will be distasteful to you? To prove that I am ready to sacrifice my own pleasures for your sake, however agreeable our present conversation is to me, I am going to speak aloud. Or else you begin."

She: "Well, go on!"

I was just opening my mouth to say something that would allow me to think of one thing while saying something else, when she began a conversation aloud which apparently could continue for a long while. In such a situation the most interesting questions are neglected because *the* conversation continues. Having each said a sentence, we fell silent, tried once more to speak, and again fell silent.

The conversation—I: "No, it is impossible to talk. Since I see that this is awkward for you, it would be better if your husband were to return."

She: (Aloud) "Well, where is Ivan Ivanovich? Ask him to come in here." . . . If anyone does not believe that there are such secret conversations, that should convince him.

"I am very glad that we are now alone," I continued, speaking silently, "I have already mentioned to you that you often offend me by your lack of confidence. If my foot accidentally touches yours, you immediately hasten to apologize and do not give me time to do so, while I, having realized that it was actually your foot, was just about to apologize myself. I cannot keep up with you, and you think me indelicate."

Her husband came in. We sat for a while, had supper, and chatted. At about twelve-thirty I went home.

IN THE SLEDGE

It was spring, the twenty-fifth of March. The night was clear and still; a young moon was visible from behind the red roof of a large white house opposite; most of the snow was already gone.

Only my night sledge was at the entrance, and even without the footman's shout of "Let's go, there!" Dmitri knew quite well that I was leaving. A smacking sound was audible, as though he were kissing someone in the dark, which, I conjectured, was intended to urge the little mare and the sledge away from the pavement stones on which the runners grated and screeched unpleasantly. Finally the sledge drew up. The solicitous footman took me under the elbow and assisted me to my seat. If he had not held me I should simply have jumped into the sledge, but as it was, in order not to offend him, I walked slowly, and broke through the thin ice which covered the puddle—getting my feet wet. "Thank you, my friend." "Dmitri, is there a frost?"—"Of course, sir; we have a bit of a frost every night now."

—How stupid! Why did I ask that?—No, there is nothing stupid about it. You wanted to talk, to enter into communication with

someone, because you are in high spirits. And why am I in high spirits? Half an hour ago if I had gotten into my sledge, I wouldn't have started to talk.—Because you spoke elegantly when taking your leave, because her husband saw you to the door and said, "When will we see you again?"—Because as soon as the footman caught sight of you he jumped up, and despite the fact that he reeked of parsley, he took pleasure in serving you.—I gave him a fifty-kopek piece a few days ago.—In all our recollections the middle falls away and the first and last impressions remain, especially the last. For this reason there exists the splendid custom of the master of the house accompanying his guest to the door, where, twining one leg about the other, as a rule, the host must say something kind to his guest. Despite any intimacy of relations, this rule should not be disregarded. Thus, for example, "When will we see you again?" means nothing, but from vanity the guest involuntarily translates it as follows: *When* means, "please make it soon;" *we* means, "not only myself but my wife, who is also pleased to see you;" *see you* means, "give us the pleasure another time;" *again* means, "we have just spent the evening together, but with you it is impossible to be bored." And the guest carries away a pleasant impression.

It is also necessary to give money to the servants, especially in homes that are not well regulated and where not all the footmen are courteous—in particular the doorman (who is the most important personage because of the first and last impression). They will greet you and see you off as if you were a member of the family, and you translate their complaisance—whose source is your fifty-kopek piece—as follows: "Everyone here loves you and honors you, therefore we try, in pleasing the masters, to please you." Perhaps it is only the footman who loves and honors you, but all the same it is pleasant. What's the harm if you are mistaken? If there were no mistakes, there would be no . . .

"Are you crazy! . . . What the devil!"

Dmitri and I were very quietly and modestly driving down one of the boulevards, keeping to the ice on the right-hand side, when suddenly some "chowderhead" (Dmitri gave him this name afterwards) in a carriage and pair ran into us. We separated, and only after we had gone on about ten paces did Dmitri say, "Look at that, the chowderhead, he doesn't know his right hand from his left!"

Don't think that Dmitri was a timid man or slow to answer. No, on the contrary, although he was of small stature, clean shaven—but with a moustache—he was deeply conscious of his own dignity

and strictly fulfilled his duties. His weakness in this case was attributable to two circumstances: 1) Dmitri was accustomed to driving vehicles which inspired respect, but now we were driving in a small sledge with very long shafts, pulled by a very small horse, which he could hardly reach even with a whip; what is more, the horse dragged its hind feet pitifully—and all this could easily evoke the derision of by-standers. Consequently this circumstance was all the more difficult for Dmitri and could quite destroy his feeling of [self-confidence?].¹ 2) Probably my question, "Is there a frost?" had reminded him of similar questions that I had asked him in the autumn on starting out to hunt. A hunter has something to day-dream about, and he forgets to hurl a well-timed curse at the driver who does not keep to the right-hand side. With coachmen, as with everyone else, the one who shouts first and with the greatest assurance is right. There are certain exceptions. For example, a droshki-driver cannot shout at a carriage; a singleton—even an elegant one—can hardly shout at a four-in-hand; but then, everything depends on the nature of the individual circumstances and, most important, on the personality of the driver and the direction in which he is going. I once saw in Tula a striking example of the influence that one man can have on others through sheer audacity.

Everyone was driving to the carnival: sleighs with pairs, four-in-hands, carriages, trotters, silk cloaks—all drawn out in a line on the Kiev highway—and there were swarms of pedestrians. Suddenly there was a shout from a side street: "Hold back, hold back your horses! Out of the way there!" in a self-assured voice. Involuntarily the pedestrians made way, the pairs and four-in-hands were reined in. And what do you think? A ragged cabby, brandishing the ends of the reins over his head, standing on a broken-down sledge drawn by a filthy jade, tore through with a shout to the other side, before anyone realized what was happening. Even the policemen burst out laughing.

Although Dmitri is a reckless fellow and loves to swear, he has a kind heart and spares his poor horse. He uses the whip not as an incentive but as a corrective, that is, he doesn't spur his horse on with the whip: this is incompatible with the dignity of a city driver. But if the trotter doesn't stand still at the entrance, he will "give him one." I had occasion to observe this presently: crossing from one street to another our little horse was hardly able to drag us along, and I noticed from the desperate movements of Dmitri's back and

¹This word is illegible in Tolstoy's manuscript.

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hands and from his clucking that he was having difficulties. Would he use the whip? That was not his custom. But what if the horse stopped? That he would not tolerate, even though here he didn't need to fear the wag who would say, "Feeding time, eh?" . . . Here was proof that Dmitri acted more from a consciousness of his duty than from vanity.

I thought much more about the many and varied relations of drivers among themselves, of their intelligence, resourcefulness, and pride. I suppose that at large gatherings those who have been involved in collisions recognize one another and pass from hostile to peaceable relations. Everything in the world is interesting, especially the relationships which exist in classes other than our own.

If the vehicles are going in the same direction the disputes last longer. The one who was to blame attempts to drive the other away or to leave him behind, and the latter sometimes succeeds in proving to him the wrongness of his action, and gains the upper hand; however, when they are driving on the same side the odds are in favor of the one whose horses are more mettlesome.

All of these relationships correspond very closely to the general relationships in life. The relationships of gentlemen among themselves and with their drivers in the case of such collisions are also interesting.—"Hey there, you scoundrel, where do you think you're going?"—When this cry is addressed to the whole vehicle, the passenger involuntarily tries to assume a serious, or gay, or unconcerned expression—in a word, one that he did not have before. It is evident that he would be pleased if the situation were reversed. I have noticed that gentlemen with moustaches are especially sensitive to the insults sustained by their vehicles.

—"Who goes there?"

This shout came from a policeman who had in my presence been very much offended by a driver this same morning. At the entrance across from his sentry-box a carriage was standing; a splendid figure of a driver with a red beard, having tucked the reins under him, and resting his elbows on his knees, was warming his back in the sun—with evident pleasure, for his eyes were almost completely closed. Opposite him the policeman walked up and down on the platform in front of his sentry-box and, using the end of his halberd, adjusted the plank which was laid across the puddles near his balcony.—Suddenly he seemed to resent the fact that the carriage was standing there, or else he began to envy the driver who was warming himself with such pleasure, or perhaps he merely

wished to start a conversation. He walked the length of his little balcony, peered into the side street, and then thumped with his halberd on the plank: "Hey you, where are you stopping? You're blocking the road." The driver unscrewed his left eye a little, glanced at the policeman, and closed it again.

—"Get a move on! I'm talking to you!" No attention.—"Are you deaf? Eh? Move along, I said!" The policeman, seeing that there was no response, walked the length of his little balcony, peered into the side street once more, and evidently was getting ready to say something devastating. At this point the driver raised himself a little, adjusted the reins under him, and turning with sleepy eyes to the policeman, said, "What are you gaping at? They wouldn't even give you a gun, you simpleton, and still you go around yelling at people!"

"Get out of here!"

The driver roused himself and got out of there.

I looked at the policeman. He muttered something and looked angrily at me; apparently he was embarrassed that I had overheard and was looking at him. I know of nothing that can offend a man more deeply than to give him to understand that you have noticed something but do not wish to mention it. As a result I became embarrassed myself; I felt sorry for the policeman and went away.

I love Dmitri's ability to give people names on the spur of the moment; it amuses me. "Get along, little cap! Get along, monkey suit! Get along, whiskers! Get along, washerwoman! Get along, horse-doctor! Get along, bigwig! Get along, M'sieu!" The Russian has an amazing ability to find the incisive epithet for a person he has never seen before, and not only for an individual, but for a whole social class. A member of the lower middle class is a "catdealer", because, it is said, they trade in catskins; a footman is a "lapper," a "lickspittle"; a peasant is "Rurick"—why, I don't know; a driver is a "waggon-eater," etc.,—it is impossible to list them all. If a Russian quarrels with someone whom he has just met, he immediately christens him with a name which goes straight to the most sensitive point: "crooked nose," "crosseyed devil," "thick-lipped scoundrel," "snub-nose." One must experience this himself to realize how accurately such epithets always hit the sorest spot. I shall never forget the insult which I once received behind my back. A Russian said of me, "Oh, he's a snaggle-toothed one!" It should be known that my teeth are extremely bad, decayed, and sparse.

AT HOME

I arrived at home. Dmitri hurried to climb down and open the gate, and I did the same so as to pass through the gate before him. It always happens this way: I hurry to go in because I am accustomed to do so; he hurries to drive me up to the porch because he is accustomed to that.—For a long time I couldn't rouse anyone with my ringing. The tallow candle had burned very low and Prov, my old footman, was asleep. While I rang I was thinking as follows: Why is it always repugnant to me to come home, no matter where or how I live—repugnant to see the same Prov in the same place, the same candle, the same spots on the wallpaper, the same pictures? The whole thing is positively dismal.

I am particularly tired of the wallpaper and the pictures because they have pretensions to variety, and after looking at them for two days in a row they are worse than a blank wall. This unpleasant sensation upon coming home is due, I suppose, to the fact that man is not meant to lead a bachelor's life at the age of twenty-two.

It would be quite different if I could ask Prov as he opens the door (he has jumped up and is clumping with his boots to show that he has been listening for a long time and is wide awake): "Is the mistress asleep?"

—"No sir, not at all, she's reading in a book"—That would be something: I should put both my hands behind her head, hold her at arm's length before me, look at her, kiss her—another look, and another kiss; and I would not feel lonely on returning home.

Now the only question that I can ask Prov—to show him that I have noticed that he never sleeps when I am not at home—is: "Did anyone call?"—"No one."—Every time I ask this question Prov answers in a pathetic voice, and I always want to say to him, "Why do you speak in such a pathetic voice? I am very glad that no one called." But I restrain myself; Prov might be offended and he is a man of dignity.

In the evening I usually write in my diary, my Franklin journal, and my daily accounts.

Today I didn't spend anything because I haven't even a half-kopek piece left, so there is nothing to write in the account book.—The diary and the journal are another matter. I ought to write in them, but it is late; I'll put it off until tomorrow.—

I have often heard the words, "He's a frivolous person; he lives without a goal." I myself have often said this, and I say it not

because I repeat other people's words but because I feel in my heart that this is bad and that one should have a goal in life.

But how is one to do this—to be a “complete person and have a goal in life”? To set up a goal for oneself is impossible.—I have tried this many times and it does not work. One should not invent a goal, but find such a one as harmonizes with man's inclinations, which existed previously, but of which one has just become aware. It seems to me I have found such a goal: a well-rounded education and the cultivation of all my talents. One of the principal accepted means for its attainment is the diary and Franklin journal. Every day I confess in my diary everything that I have done badly. I have my weaknesses written out in columns in the journal—laziness, mendacity, gluttony, indecision, the desire to show off, sensuality, lack of *fierté*, etc.,—all such petty addictions. I post my transgressions from the diary to the journal by placing little crosses in the columns.

As I began to undress I thought: “Where in all this is your well-rounded education and the cultivation of your talents, of your virtue? Will you ever attain to virtue by this path? Where is this journal leading you?—It serves you only as an indication of your weaknesses, which have no end, and which increase every day. Even if you overcame these weaknesses you would not attain to virtue.—You are only deceiving yourself and playing with this like a child with a toy.—Surely it is not sufficient for an artist to know what things should not be done in order to become an artist. Surely one cannot accomplish anything worthwhile merely by negatively refraining from doing harm. It is not enough for the farmer to weed his field, he must till and sow. Set up rules of virtue and follow them.”—It was the part of my mind which is occupied with criticism that said this.

I became thoughtful. Surely it is not enough to destroy the cause of evil in order to bring about the good. Good is positive and not negative. And it is sufficient that good is positive and evil negative for the very reason that evil can be destroyed but good cannot. Good is always in our soul and the soul is good; but evil is implanted. If there were no evil the good would develop freely. The comparison with the farmer is not valid; he has to sow and plow, but in the soul the good is already sown. The artist must practice and he will master his art, if he does not conform to negative rules, but he must [be free?]² from arbitrariness. Practice is not necessary for the exercise of virtue—the practice is life itself.

²This word is illegible in Tolstoy's manuscript.

Cold is the absence of heat. Darkness is the absence of light, evil the absence of good.—Why does man love heat, light, and good? Because they are natural. There is a cause of heat, light, and good—the sun, God; but there is no cold or dark sun, no evil God. We see light and rays of light, we seek the cause and say that there is a sun. Light and heat and the law of gravitation prove this to us. This is in the physical world. In the moral world we see good, we see its rays, we see that there is a law of gravitation of the good towards something higher, and that its source is God.—

Remove the coarse crust from a diamond and it will sparkle; throw off the envelope of weaknesses and you will find virtue. But is it possible that it is only these trifles, these little weaknesses which you write down in the journal that prevent you from being good? Are there not greater passions? And why is such a large number added every day: *it is either self-deception or faintheartedness*, or something of the kind. There is no lasting improvement. In many respects there is no progress at all.—Again the part occupied with criticism made this observation.

It is true that all the weaknesses that I have written down may be reduced to three classes, but since each has many degrees they may be combined in infinite ways. 1) Pride, 2) weakness of will, 3) deficiency of intelligence.—But it is not possible to relate all weaknesses individually to a given class, for they result from a combination. The first two classes have decreased; the last, as an independent one, can make progress only with time. For example, I lied recently, and clearly without cause. I was asked to dinner. I refused and then said that I could not come because I had a lesson.—What kind?—An English lesson, I said, when I actually had gymnastics. The reasons: 1) lack of intelligence, that I failed to observe at once that it was stupid to lie, 2) lack of resolution, that I did not say why, 3) stupid pride, assuming that an English lesson is a better excuse than gymnastics.—

Surely virtue does not consist of correcting the weaknesses which harm you in life. It would seem in such a case that virtue is self-denial.—But that is not true. Virtue brings happiness because happiness brings virtue.—Whenever I write candidly in my diary I do not experience the least vexation toward myself for my weaknesses; it seems to me that when I avow them, they have already ceased to exist.

This is pleasant. I said my prayers and lay down to sleep. In the evening I pray better than in the morning; I understand better what

I am saying and feeling. In the evening I do not fear myself, in the morning I do—there is much before me.

Sleep in all its phases is a wonderful thing: the preparation, falling asleep, and sleep itself.—As soon as I lay down I thought, "What a delight to wrap oneself up warmly and immediately forget oneself in sleep." But as soon as I began to fall asleep I remembered that it is pleasant to fall asleep, and I woke up. All the pleasures of the body are destroyed by consciousness. One should not be conscious; but I was conscious that I was conscious, and I continued to be conscious, and I couldn't go to sleep. How annoying! Why did God give us consciousness when it only interferes with life?—Because moral pleasures on the contrary are felt more deeply when they are conscious.

Reflecting thus, I turned over onto the other side and in so doing uncovered myself. What a disagreeable sensation to uncover yourself in the dark. It always seems as if some one or something is clutching me or something cold or hot is touching my bare leg. I covered myself up quickly, tucked the blanket in under me on all sides, hid my head and began to go to sleep; it seemed to me that under this blanket no one and nothing could reach me.—My thoughts ran as follows:

"Morpheus, enfold me in your embrace." This is a Divinity whose priest I would willingly become. And do you remember how the young lady was insulted when they said to her: "*Quand je suis passé chez vous, vous étiez encore dans les bras de Morphée.*" She thought Morphée was a name like André or Malaphée. What a comical name! . . . A charming expression, *dans les bras*; I picture to myself so clearly and elegantly the condition *dans les bras*,—and especially clearly the *bras* themselves—dimpled arms, bare to the shoulder, with little folds of skin, and a white chemise indiscreetly open.—How wonderful arms are in general, especially if they have a little dimple!—I stretched. Do you remember, Saint Thomas forbade stretching. He is like Didrikhs. They rode with him on horseback. The baiting was fine. Gelke rode beside the district police officer hallooing to the hounds, and Nalyot was doing his best, even on the frozen mud. How vexed Seryozha³ was! He's at sister's.—How lovely Masha⁴ is—if only I could find such a wife! Morpheus would be good on a hunt, only the naked one must ride, or else you might find a wife.—Bah, how Saint Thomas rolls—and the lady has

³Tolstoy's brother, Sergei Nikolaevich.

⁴Tolstoy's sister, Maria Nikolaevna.

already set off to overtake them all; she stretches out in vain, but then that wonderful *dans les bras*.—Here I suppose I went to sleep completely.—I dreamed that I wanted to overtake the young lady, suddenly there was a mountain, I pushed it with my hands, pushed it again—it collapsed; (I threw down the pillow) and I came home to eat. Not ready yet. Why not?—Vasili was swaggering loudly (it was the mistress of the house asking from behind the partition what the noise was, and the chambermaid answering her; I heard this, that is why I dreamed it). Vasili came in just as everyone wanted to ask him why it wasn't ready. They saw that Vasili was in his undershirt and that there was a ribbon across his chest; I became frightened, I fell on my knees, cried and kissed his hand; it was as pleasant to me as though I were kissing her hands,—even more so. Vasili took no notice of me and asked, "Have you loaded?" The Tula pastry-cook Didrikhs said, "Ready!"—"Well, fire!"—They discharged a volley. (The shutter banged.)—Vasili and I started to dance the polonaise, but it was no longer Vasili, it was she. Suddenly, oh horror! I noticed that my trousers were so short that my bare knees were showing. It is impossible to describe how I suffered (my legs became uncovered; for a long time I wasn't able to cover them up in my sleep, but finally I did). We continued dancing the polonaise and the Queen of Württemberg was there; suddenly I started to dance a Russian dance. Why?—I couldn't restrain myself. Finally they brought me an overcoat and boots; but even worse: no trousers at all. It cannot be that I am awake; surely I am asleep. I woke up.—I went to sleep again.—I thought, then I could no longer think; I began to imagine things, but I imagined them connectedly and pictorially; then my imagination went to sleep; dark images remained. Then my body went to sleep too.—A dream is made up of the first and last impressions.

Sleep is a condition in which man completely loses consciousness; but since a man goes to sleep by degrees, he also loses consciousness by degrees. Consciousness is what is called the soul; but the soul is regarded as something simple, while there are as many consciousnesses as there are separate parts of a human being. It seems to me that there are three such parts: 1) mind, 2) feeling, 3) body.—1) The first is the highest and this consciousness is an attribute of intelligent people only; animals and animal-like men do not have it. It goes to sleep first. 2) The consciousness of feeling is also an attribute of men only; it goes to sleep next. 3) The consciousness of the body goes to sleep last and seldom completely.—Animals do not have this

gradation of consciousness, nor do people when they are in such a state that they lose all consciousness—after a strong shock or when intoxicated.—The consciousness of being asleep awakens one immediately.

The recollection of the time which we spend asleep does not proceed from the same source as do the recollections of real life—i.e., from memory, the ability to reproduce our impressions—but from the ability to group impressions. In the moment of awakening we unite all the impressions which we received while going to sleep and while asleep (man almost never sleeps completely) under the influence of the impression which caused us to awaken. This process is the same as falling asleep: it proceeds by degrees, starting with the lowest faculty and ending with the highest. This takes place so rapidly that it is impossible to detect it, and being accustomed to consistency and to the form of time in which life manifests itself, we accept this aggregate of impressions as a recollection of time passed in sleep. In this way you may explain the fact that you have a long dream which ends with the circumstance which awakened you.—You dream that you are going hunting, you load your gun, flush the game, take aim, fire—and the noise which you take for the shot is the water bottle which you knocked onto the floor in your sleep. Or you come to see your friend N., you wait for him, and finally a servant comes in and reports that N. has arrived; this is actually being said to you by your own servant to wake you up.

If you wish to check the accuracy of this explanation, you should not in any case believe the dreams which are told you by people who always dream something significant and interesting. These people are accustomed to draw conclusions from dreams according to the principles of fortune-telling; they have set up a certain form to which everything is reduced. They supply what is lacking from their imagination and omit everything that does not fit into this form. For example, a mother will tell you that she dreamed that her daughter flew up into the sky and said: "Farewell, mother dear, I shall pray for you"! And what she really dreamed was that her daughter climbed up onto the roof and said nothing, and after she had climbed up the daughter suddenly became the cook Ivan and said, "Don't you climb up here."

Perhaps what they tell is made up by their imaginations from mere force of habit; if so, this is a further proof of my theory of dreams. . . .

If you wish to verify what you yourself experience, recall your

thoughts and images at the time of going to sleep and of waking up, and if anyone watched you while you were sleeping and can tell you all the circumstances which could have produced an effect on you, you will understand why you dreamed what you did and not something else. These circumstances are so numerous, depending on your constitution, on your digestion, and on physical causes, that it is impossible to enumerate them all. But it is said that when we dream that we are flying or swimming this means that we are growing. Notice why you swim one day and fly another; recollect everything, and you can explain it very easily.

If one of those persons who are in the habit of interpreting dreams had dreamed my dream, here is how it would be told. "I saw Saint Thomas running and running for a long time, and I said to him: 'Why are you running?' and he said to me: 'I am seeking the bride.'—So you see, he will either get married or there will be a letter from him. . . ."

Note also that there is no chronological order to your recollections. If you will recall your dreams, you will realize that at some time in the past you actually saw what you dreamed later.—During the night you wake up several times (almost always), but only the two lower degrees of consciousness—body and feeling—are awakened. After this, feeling and body go to sleep again—and the impressions which were received at the time of this awakening join the general impression of the dream without any order or consistency. If the third, higher consciousness of understanding awoke also and afterwards went to sleep again, the dream would be divided into two parts.

ANOTHER DAY (ON THE VOLGA)

I took it into my head to travel from Saratov to Astrakhan by way of the Volga. In the first place, I thought, it is better in case of bad weather to travel a longer distance rather than jolt over bad roads for seven hundred versts; besides, the picturesque banks of the Volga, the dreams, the danger—all this is pleasant and may have a beneficial effect. I fancied myself a poet, I called to mind my favorite characters and heroes, putting myself in their places.—In a word, I thought, as I always think when I undertake anything new, "Only now real life is beginning; until now it has been merely a preface which was hardly worth bothering about." I know that this is nonsense. I have observed many times that I always remain the same and that I am no more a poet on the Volga than on the Voronka,⁵ but

⁵A stream on the grounds at Yasnaya Polyana.

I still believe, I still seek, I still wait for something. It always seems to me when I am in doubt whether to do something that a voice says: you won't really do that, you won't go there, and yet it was there that happiness was waiting for you; now you have let it escape for ever.—It always seems to me that something is about to start without me.—Although this is silly, it is the reason why I travelled by way of the Volga to Astrakhan. I used to be afraid and ashamed to act on such silly grounds, but no matter how much I examine my past life, I find that for the most part I have acted on grounds that were no less silly. I don't know how it is with others, but I am used to this, and for me the words "trivial" and "ludicrous" have become words without meaning. Where are the "large" and "serious" grounds?

I set off for the Moscow ferry and began to saunter about among the boats and rafts. "Are these boats taken? Is there a free one?" I asked a group of barge-haulers who were standing on the shore. "And what does your worship require?" an old man with a long beard in a gray peasant's coat and lamb's-wool hat asked me.—"A boat to Astrakhan." "Well, that can be managed, sir!"—

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Book Reviews

GLIKSMAN, JERZY. *Tell the West*. N. Y., The Gresham Press, 1948. 358 pp. \$3.75.

GOUZENKO, IGOR. *The Iron Curtain*. N. Y., Dutton, 1948. 280 pp. \$3.00.

KORIAKOV, MIKHAIL. *I'll Never Go Back*. Transl. by Nicholas Wreden. N. Y., Dutton, 1948. 248 pp. \$3.00.

Here are some new additions to the growing literature of first-hand accounts of Soviet Russia written either by disappointed former adherents or the escaped victims of the Stalinist régime. There is a tendency in certain quarters to dismiss such writings as proceeding from "prejudiced" sources. I do not share this point of view. Most of the books on present-day Russia are written with a certain degree of emotional involvement, and the writings in question are not an exception. Neither is there any reason for them to be treated differently from similar accounts of the despotic governments of the past or other brands of modern totalitarianism. Like any testimony on a controversial subject, this one, too, must be approached in a critical spirit, and its validity should be tested by its intrinsic probability as well as by evidence available from other sources.

In my opinion, all the three volumes under review will stand such a test. The first of them was written by a Polish-Jewish Socialist who was arrested by the Soviet authorities after the occupation of Eastern Poland by the Red Army in 1939. Deported to Russia, he spent the next two years in Soviet prisons and concentration camps until he was

liberated on the basis of the short-lived Stalin-Sikorski agreement. The book is a simply but powerfully written account remarkable for the degree of detachment which the author has been able to preserve. A keen and understanding observer, Mr. Gliksman has given an unforgettable picture of life in a Soviet forced labor camp and of the effect it has on human beings. It is a historical document of first-rate importance, and it should not be ignored by anyone who wants to form an honest opinion on the subject.

Mr. Gouzenko's book is somewhat disappointing. It has attracted considerable attention due to the author's part in the sensational Canadian spy case and because it has been made into a film. But it is not too well written and contains relatively little new information. Of greater interest, in Mr. Gouzenko's account of his life in Russia, are some details of his training in the Soviet Military Engineering Academy and his work at the Intelligence Headquarters in Moscow. Strangely enough, the dramatic story of the author's own experience in Canada has been told less effectively than it was done by Mr. Hirsch in a book published shortly after the event. One has to note also the obvious traces of hasty editing and proof-reading: the transliteration of many Russian names is questionable, and there are such misprints as *Stanov* for *Zhdanov*.

In contrast with Mr. Gouzenko's volume, Mr. Koriakov's book has not attracted the degree of attention it deserves. In my opinion, it is one

of the most interesting accounts so far written by Russian "non-repatriates" those who have refused to "go back." Not only is Mr. Koriakov endowed with a sensitive literary style (it has been rendered into excellent English by Nicholas Wreden) but his whole approach is highly individual. The book is, first of all, a story of the author's personal conversion from the official materialist creed to a religious world outlook—a process which had started during his pre-war life in Soviet Russia and later was given a powerful impetus by his wartime experiences. But to Mr. Koriakov, the war was a turning point not only in his personal life but in the life of the Russian people as well. In the ordeal of the war, the shallowness of the official ideology was revealed, the forced "communization of spirit" proved to be "nothing more than disguised chaos and disintegration," and it was only the survival among the Russian people of fundamental, human, and national, values that saved the country from destruction. Russia's future depends on the preservation and ultimate triumph of these values.

These general ideas are expressed by the author not in an abstract or dogmatic fashion, but in the form of a commentary on a swiftly moving and often exciting narrative.

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TOWSTER, JULIAN. *Political Power in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1947*. With an introduction by Quincy Wright. New York, Oxford University Press, 1948. 443 pp. \$6.00.

Professor Towster has written a book which is almost encyclopedic

in character and explores much Soviet political literature never before synthesized. It is an excellent volume to accompany lectures on the Soviet form of government, and will probably achieve its principal reputation in that field. It is not a book of opinion of a former resident of the U.S.S.R. but a detailed study of material available for research in the United States.

The outline of the volume is conventional—theory, constitutional history, the Communist Party, the Soviets, the administrative apparatus, the courts, and the social structure. Students of Soviet theory will find full usage of their favorite quotations. There will be points of disagreement on emphasis, as, for example, the statement that the sole prerequisite for the withering away of law is the evolution among the Soviet peoples of a custom of habitual observation of the fundamental rules of communal living. Soviet literature lays equal, if not at times primary stress, upon industrial and agricultural production to the point of abundance as a prerequisite of Communism. Professor Towster knows this also as is indicated in later chapters, but it bears repeating in any discussion of Soviet theories of "withering" of the state and law. Education in communal living is not believed to be sufficient. In fact Communism is believed almost impossible without a plentifully supplied community.

Historians will probably take issue with Professor Towster's explanation of the evolution of the social structure of pre-Bolshevik Russia. Can it be said for example, that "of the five social classes established by law in pre-revolutionary Russia—the nobility, the clergy,

the merchants, the so-called 'burghers' and the peasants—the first alone wielded political power"? Is it not necessary to explain how civil servants became nobles? The author would probably have been on surer ground if he had said that the nobility wielded dominant power, at least to 1905, while thereafter the dominance of the nobility was seriously undermined.

The constitutional history includes an extensive and lucid summary of Marxist and Soviet thinking on self-determination, with the conclusion that the interests of Socialism stand higher than the interests and the rights of nations to self-determination. The powers of the Union and Autonomous Republics are studied with relationship to this thesis. Some readers who seek interpretation will be disappointed that the author merely recounts the constitutional amendments of 1944 changing the status of the Commissariats of Defense and Foreign affairs from All-Union to Union-Republic classification. Professor Towster's self-limitation to the chronicling of events, except in the final chapters when he allows himself a few guesses as to motives and future course, is characteristic of two thirds of the volume.

Meticulous readers who have come to expect footnote references to Soviet legal documents for constitutional history will regret Professor Towster's citing of the *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune* as a primary source for events in constitutional history, such as the discontinuance of four autonomous republics and one autonomous region after the war because of their wartime record, and the admission of the Baltic Republics into the Union. While there is greater ref-

erence to legislation in later chapters, one has the impression at several places that Professor Towster does not feel at home in the statutes and prefers secondary sources.

The chapters on party history and structure are particularly commendable. Programs, rules, and statistics are presented and analyzed. Minutes of Party congresses are examined in detail. A comparison of the number of participants in debates is made, with the conclusion that as the congress membership has grown to unwieldy proportions, the element of deliberation at the Congress has decreased while that of accounting for actions in the past by participants has increased. The same method is used in analyzing the work of other Party agencies.

The review of the elimination of opposition within the Party is that of a reporter. There is no attempt to evaluate the merits of the various positions taken by the opposition, whether of "right" or "left." This is probably a healthy approach in a textbook. Students can examine the polemical documents to study the arguments themselves in their full form, without which no real understanding is possible.

The governmental and administrative structure is analyzed in similar terms—namely on the record. The electoral system is explained on the ground that "basically elections in the U.S.S.R. are conceived as not merely a method of recruiting the personnel of the Soviets, but as a means of demonstrating to the population and the world at large the unity of Soviet society behind the Party and the government, and on occasion to rouse the people to further efforts."

The social forces in the U.S.S.R. are analyzed in the most readable

part of the book. Some conclusions are sharply at variance with conceptions of many American experts, yet they have much validity. For example, Professor Towster believes that it is too early to conclude that a new dominant class is emerging. He finds that the social groups are at present politically balanced to an extent that would prevent exclusive assertion or usurpation of power by any one of them. Numerous statistical tables are set forth in support of this conclusion.

The position of the Party is found not to have been weakened fundamentally by the experience of the war. On the contrary, Professor Towster believes that it has emerged with heightened popular prestige. It continues to play "the role of integrator, director, and adjuster and there is nothing to indicate any change in its position in the immediate future." Such a conclusion suggests that care should be used in accepting blindly the idea popular in some quarters in the United States that the U.S.S.R. can be expected to mellow and even break up because of its weakened Party structure. While there is much in the immense growth of the Party with consequent lowering of average political education, which indicates a problem of leadership, it seems probable, to this reviewer at least, that Professor Towster is nearer the actuality on this question than the "mellowing and breaking up" school.

In spite of the criticism which can be levelled at any volume touching so many subjects on which there are already specialists concerned with the substance of almost every chapter, this book should be examined by every serious student of the Soviet system of government.

It is an extraordinary compendium of detail which no one can afford to overlook, least of all the teachers of the subject.

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ROBERTS, LESLIE. *Home from the Cold Wars*. Boston, the Beacon Press, 1948. 224 pp. \$2.50.

MATTHIESSEN, F. O. *From the Heart of Europe*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1948. 194 pp. \$3.

In two vastly different styles but with strikingly one mind a journalist and a professor report on the Europe they saw in 1947-48. Both are concerned with the U.S.S.R.'s rôle in the world's destiny. Neither goes to the root of the problem—the substance of the Soviet way of life. In varying degree both give Stalin the benefit of whatever doubts they may have about his aims and means.

Mr. Roberts, a Canadian newspaperman, writes glib but superficial and undistinguished prose. Professor Matthiessen brings to the reader the introspection of a Harvard lecturer on literature along with his elegant style. The Canadian, however, has two advantages: first, in the spring of 1948 he actually visited Moscow, whereas the American lectured in Europe—from July to December 1947—no farther east than Budapest; secondly, the Canadian was in Prague as late after the Communist coup d'état as June, 1948, but the American left Prague in December, 1947, two months before the event.

The conflict between the East and the West is the theme of both books. Both pronounce a plague on both

houses, yet somehow manage to blame the West far more than the East for what they term as unprogressive policies and warmongering. By his book's end Mr. Roberts admits that he has spoken "to Sam more bluntly than to Joe." His lame explanation is that when Washington misbehaves (and, according to Mr. Roberts, it misbehaves constantly towards the U.S.S.R., toward Canada, toward the world in general), Canada is more directly affected than when Moscow is naughty. Canada, he points out, is so much nearer geographically to the United States than to the Soviet Union, and her economy is closely intertwined with the American economy. The modern-age weapons, bringing all nations uncomfortably close together, apparently do not worry him. Nor does the peculiar messianic belligerency of the Politbureau, which certainly cannot be bracketed with the credo and militancy of the Pentagon.

Early in his book, in keeping with his pretense of impartiality, Mr. Roberts recognizes the existence of the Iron Curtain "sealing off . . . the Soviet people from the rest of mankind." But in the same breath he proclaims that despite this "the Muscovite at home contrives to have himself a pretty good time." He speaks of theaters, of privately owned cars, of the new upper and middle classes enjoying a fine life in the U.S.S.R. He omits to tell us at any similar length that, besides these high government officials, privileged professionals, and well-fed Stakhanovites, there are also the masses. As to how wretchedly these live in Russia, we can learn from the recent report of the Norwegian trade-union delegation, not from Mr. Roberts' book. Only flittingly

does he give us a glimpse of "weary-looking women . . . on the bottom of the pile" who do menial work "all day and then go home to queue up at the market." Concentration camps are hardly mentioned.

Those Russians who flee from such a life arouse Mr. Roberts' ire. To him they are unspeakable turncoats. Instead of being grateful to Igor Gouzenko (as every loyal Canadian and true liberal should be), Mr. Roberts attacks him repeatedly, calling him "a pilferer . . . of secret documents from his Embassy" who exposed Soviet espionage in Canada not out of any high motives but to make "a profitable deal." Mr. Roberts' hatred for the "traitors to the Soviet Union" well-nigh pathological. Stubbornly he maintains that the point is not whether the Soviet government "is right or wrong." It's a *government*; therefore no Russian should protest or flee. But it was all right for him, the foreigner, to rage at a minor Soviet secret police official in Lvov for trying to confiscate Mr. Roberts' letters—to rage and win his letters back!

In brief, oppression and slavery are perfectly legitimate if they do not victimize Mr. Roberts. Any excuses for such a way of life and death are acceptable to him, no matter what the Soviet forces may try to do inside or outside Russia. Thus, Mr. Roberts agrees with them eagerly that the February, 1948 events in Prague had to happen to save Czechoslovakia from "the West's policy on Germany." The Italian poll of April, 1948 "was no free election" because the West helped Italy's non-Communists to make their stand. And then Mr. Roberts complains that some people call him "a confused liberal." He

has something there, at least to the extent of one-half of his sorrowful denial: of course he isn't a liberal.

Professor Matthiessen, unlike Mr. Roberts, understands at least some of the retrogressive aspects of the Soviet system. With apparent sympathy he sketches an Austrian student of his (at the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies): "He is not a Russia-hater, but . . . if he had to decide, which he does not want to be forced to, between capitalism and communism, he would chose capitalism, on the grounds that once you have communism with its rigorous controls and secret police (this is what he sees of the Russians in Vienna), you will never get through to democracy, whereas from capitalism you can, as the people want it, advance toward socialism." Professor Matthiessen blames not only the National Association of Manufacturers but also the Politbureau for not wanting writers to be "deeply disturbing." He declares: "You will not make people . . . better workers for the next five-year plan by preventing them from reading Akhmatova." He ascribes to the Politbureau's deadly hand "the unimaginative limitations of most current Russian painting."

But at the same time he lovingly refers to the "selfless tradition of Lenin." He sees Lenin—and William Z. Foster and Harry Bridges (with whom he has fellow-traveled in the States)—not in their actual rôles of haters of humanity, but, in accordance with their pretense, as noble friends of mankind. He idealizes Henry Wallace; he carps and cavils at America incessantly; and he frowns upon a young Hungarian intellectual for his fond reminiscence of his visit in America—this America

of which he and Wallace disapprove. A Czech or Hungarian Communist to Professor Matthiessen is usually a quiet, intelligent man; but a Social-Democrat of the anti-Communist type is voluble and naïve. The professor describes the restrictions put upon Hungary's liberals by the Communist government, and then chides these liberals for not being as well organized as the Communists are! In two lengthy footnotes he accepts the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia with but a few trivial reservations. Despite its acknowledged brutality the Soviet régime is still the world's greatest hope to him. Is this impartiality? Is this delicate balance? To apply to Professor Matthiessen's writing his own definition of the work of a certain poetess, all such lapses make his book "delicately dense."

There are errors of fact in both books, fewer in Professor Matthiessen's than in Mr. Roberts'. Most startlingly the professor credits Trotsky with "the great moral truth . . . that only the means suitable to a socialist humanity will achieve socialism, that brutal means will always carry over into brutal ends." Actually, Trotsky—like Lenin and Stalin—believed up to his death that any means were permissible to achieve an end. Mr. Roberts makes the common mistake of denying that freedom has ever been "in the Russian tradition," thus excusing absence of freedom in Russia today. To a point of an outright blunder he exaggerates the rôle of Western intervention in the early Soviet period. And, making one more display of his ignorance of things Russian, he misspells Russian names and words: it's Stvetnoi for Tsvet-

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ALBERT PARRY

Colgate University

Soviet Press Translations. Editor: PROFESSOR IVAR SPECTOR. Published 18 times a year by the Far Eastern Institute of the University of Washington. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Annual subscription, \$10.00.

Among primary source material made available in English translation, the *Soviet Press Translations* in two years of publication—first mimeographed edition, October 31, 1946, first printed edition, July 1, 1947—have upheld a high standard of selectivity and reliability. In the early stage of publication the emphasis was upon Asiatic Russia and the Far East with *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* as the principal sources. The topical index of volumes I and II (1946–1947), however, shows the broad coverage not only of the Soviet press (*Izvestiya*, *Pravda*, and the trade union paper *Trud*) but lists materials from such general magazines as *Krokodil* and *Ogonek*, and from Party, professional, and academic journals such as *Bolshevik*, *Za Oboronu*, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, *Mirovoe Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika*, *Voprosy Istorii*, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, and *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*. All the articles, editorials, reviews, and news items from the Soviet press (in the broad sense as indicated) are unabridged translations and—after some experimenting as to the best translations of Russian technical terms and abbreviations—a high degree has been attained in conforming to the letter and spirit of the originals.

The content of the first two volumes has been listed in the domestic field under the classifications: Agriculture, Industry, State Administration, Communist Party Affairs, Public Welfare, Military Affairs, Soviet Far East (7 articles), Arts, Education, and Science; in the field of foreign affairs under the headings: World Affairs, UN, Far East (44 items), Southeastern Asia, Middle East and Africa, Soviet Europe, Western Europe, United States, Latin America and Canada, and Australia. Since the summer of 1947, the news distribution in *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* is being tabulated (Vol. II, No. 16 ff.) in order to determine the focus of attention in both papers and to select the articles in accordance with the analysis.

Merely to illustrate the varied fields of translation, people interested in Soviet law will find A. Vyshinsky's article on the abolition of capital punishment (*Pravda*, May 27, 1947) in Vol. II, No. 15; M. Strogovitch's review of Vyshinsky's *Theory of Court Evidence in Soviet Law* (*Izvestiya*, June 11, 1947), in Vol. III, No. 1; G. M. Sverdlov's article on basic factors in the development of Soviet family law (*Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* 1947, No. 10) in Vol. III, No. 16; and G. Polyanskaya's article on property relations in the *kolkhoz* household (*Sov. Gos-vo i Pravo* 1947, No. 7) in Vol. III, No. 18. Three articles on the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, including the speech of the Soviet Prosecutor A. N. Vasiliev, are important for the historian of Japanese foreign policy because of the quotations from captured documents of the years 1934–1943 (Vol. III, Nos. 7, 9, and 14). P. Eidus' review of Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's *Ten Years in*

Japan (Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mir. Politika, 1947, No. 5) is translated in Vol. II, No. 21. *The Fundamental Law of the Mongol People's Republic*, taken from *Sov. Gosudarstvo i Pravo* 1947, No. 8, is to be found in Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 3-29. K. Ostrovitanov's and M. Galaktionov's criticism of N. Voznesensky's book *The Wartime Economy of the U.S.S.R. during the Patriotic War* (*Pravda*, January 3, 1948) is available in Vol. III, No. 7; so are three articles by E. Varga written before he was ousted from the directorship of the Institute for World Economy and World Politics: "The Anglo-Americans and 'Freedom of Navigation' on the Danube," "Oil in the Near East," and "Inflation and Monetary Reforms in Capitalist Countries": Vol. II, Nos. 1 and 13; Vol. III, No. 4; and four by E. Tarle, the leading spokesman among Soviet historians: "Unification or Federation; on the Question of the Political Organization of Germany," "The Great Service of the Soviet Union to Humanity," "The Struggle for Peace and Democracy," and "The 'Holy Alliance' of 1948": Vol. II, Nos. 10 and 14, Vol. III, Nos. 6 and 11.

The foregoing hints to materials made accessible in exemplary translations are sufficient proof that the *Soviet Press Translations* are doing a great service to scholars in academic and governmental research.

FRITZ T. EPSTEIN.

*The Hoover Library
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VERNADSKY, GEORGE. *Kievan Russia*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948. 412 pp. \$5.00.

During the Kievan period "monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy"

developed separately "in three distinct regions of Old Russia." This variety of political experience destroys "the myth of totalitarianism being inherent in the Russian mentality," and makes the Kievan period a fascinating subject "for the student of government." It also is a fascinating study for anyone who desires to discover the roots from which the pattern of East Slavic civilization, and its contradictions, have grown.

For various reasons, however, the study has not attracted the western scholar. Aside from the rare translations of Russian medieval texts and a few monographs, the field until lately has been little explored. Introducing *Le Moyen Age Russe* by A. Eck (1933), Henri Pirenne confessed: "*Du sujet traité par M. Eck, je ne connais, à bien peu de choses près, que ce qu'il m'en a appris.*" Alexander Eck was a Russian naturalized in Belgium. It has become indeed the task of scholars thrown out of Russia to fill the open gap in the studies of the Middle Ages. Lately, American literature has benefited most by their efforts. Within the last three years have appeared Fedotov's *The Russian Religious Mind: Kievan Christianity* (1946), Vernadsky's *Medieval Russian Laws* (1947), and Roman Jakobson's *Tale of Igor* edited by the Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves in New York (1948). The newly published *Kievan Russia* is a landmark in this outstanding series.

Kievan Russia is more than "an attempt at reappraisal of disputed historiographical issues and criticism of sources," as Professor Vernadsky modestly puts it in a foreword. The book is a great achievement. Although not every reader

will accept its interpretations and conclusions, it is a remarkable and, for that matter, unique contribution to Anglo-American historical literature. For the first time, a full integration of the East Slavic medieval society is attempted. The political history is given as a framework, within which economic foundations, social organization, government and administration, foreign relations, religion, culture, family, and ways of life are studied and described. The gaps left by sources are adroitly bridged. The narrative is well planned and balanced. For a scholar, it is a useful summary and provocative reading.

One may wish that the author had more clearly followed the distinction between the different socio-political patterns "in the three distinct regions of Old Russia" outlined in Chapter I, and made his study comparative throughout the book. Perhaps northeastern Russia would then have entered the contest as the fourth "distinct region." As it is, the patterns appear more uniform and systematic than in all probability they were. Like all attempts at systematization, this study is controversial, but the author skilfully avoids the pitfalls and, often chooses the middle of the road course in dealing with controversial issues.

Were the Norsemen or the native Slavs the founders of the Kievan State? What was its type of economy and the socio-political structure? Was Kievan Russia a state? Both the Norman and the Slavophile (and Soviet) theories are rejected by Vernadsky; in his opinion, "The Scandinavian influence on the development of Russian civilization must have been of considerable importance," but "in any case one should not oversimplify the

problem by assuming without reservation, a wholesale importation to Russia of purely Norse ideas and habits directly from Scandinavia." The narrative shows that the Kievan society had been shaped in the interaction of Scandinavian and Slavic elements, "both to some extent dependent on the Byzantine and Oriental background" (pp. 336-337). The theories of Klyuchevsky and Grekov are reconciled: agriculture "was one of the mainstays of Russian national economy in the Kievan period," though foreign trade in nonagricultural products "was undoubtedly the primary factor in shaping the policies" of Kievan Russia (pp. 99-162). Professor Vernadsky is less conciliatory on the issue of feudalism. Recognizing that certain elements in the social structure of Kievan Russia may, with great reservations, be termed "feudal"—more comparable with the eastern than with the western patterns—he destroys the theory of Grekov and Yushkov. "In contrast to the West, not the feudal manor, but the city was the dominant factor in the country's economic and social development" (p. 8). There were "feudal cities" in the West, but the parallelism is questionable even with the Novgorod city-republic. The pages relating to the discussion of "economic, social and political feudalism" in Kievan Russia are most instructive and convincing.

Chapter IV dealing with the political period of 990 to 1139 is titled "The Kievan Realm." The term does not seem to this reviewer to be a very happy one, but it has the advantage of being ambiguous enough to avoid a direct answer to the question whether or not the Russia of St. Vladimir was a state.

On the other hand, the period of 1139 to 1237 is described as "The Russian Federation." Even with the reservation that this was "a very loose federation indeed" (p. 215), the contents of Chapter VIII hardly warrant its title. In another connection, the princely domains are compared to the Roman estates, and the cities to the city-republics of ancient Greece. One would wish the parallels had been elaborated.

No issue of early Russian history is closed when the reader closes the book. But his understanding is infinitely increased. Not only will *Kievan Russia* enlarge his factual knowledge, it will also provide him with a sure and intelligent guide through the most ambiguous period of Russia's past.

NICHOLAS P. VAKAR

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HECHT, DAVID. *Russian Radicals Look to America, 1825-1894*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1947. 242 pp. \$4.00.

Mr. Hecht's book is undoubtedly an important contribution toward the understanding of Russo-American ideological contacts, a field which has been almost neglected, but which has become increasingly important with the growth of relations between this country and the Soviet Union.

The author describes the views and teachings of Russian radicals beginning with Alexander Herzen and his *alter ego*, Ogarev, going successively through Bakunin, Chernyshevsky, Lavrov, and Chaikovsky. To be sure, the sequence of this treatment might be questioned. While the title delimits the topic

chronologically between 1825 and 1894, Mr. Hecht actually begins his analysis much later than 1825 and ends it before 1894. The book begins with Herzen, that is to say in the 1840's and ends in the 1880's. Had the chronological scope been as indicated by the title, some consideration ought to have been given to Nicholas Turgenev and also to the first fathers of Russian Marxism. Turgenev, the only outstanding Decembrist writer who lived and wrote in Europe, was very much interested in "looking to America." The title would have been more accurate if it had indicated the limits as roughly from the 1840's to the 1880's.

Mr. Hecht correctly emphasizes the influence of De Tocqueville's classical work, *American Democracy*, upon Herzen. The latter willingly followed De Tocqueville's conception of two giant countries, each of which stretched over one-half of the earth and each of which started from different points. This "geo-political" concept was very close to the heart of that non-Orthodox Russian westerner, Herzen. After his disappointment with the European revolutions of 1848, he became particularly pro-American, hoping to find in America something more than merely a corrected edition of old Europe, which for him had become the incarnation of petty bourgeois cowards. His hope was intertwined with apprehension that America might finally submit to the middle-way dullness of Europe of which, in Herzen's mind, she was only a colony. These two contradictory feelings are the best explanation of the inconsistency of his evaluation of America.

Mr. Hecht sometimes does not go deeply enough into the historical

and social background of the views which he describes and interprets. One illustration must serve to bear out this point. He quotes Herzen's famous article, "America and Siberia" which appeared in the *Kolo-kol (Bell)* of December 1, 1858, but he did not go to the American article to which Herzen's essay was only a reply. This article, entitled "Our Western Neighbor," was printed in the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin* on October 8, 1858, after the announcement of the Sino-Russian treaty concerning the region of the Amur and the Pacific. The *Bulletin* emphasizes the commercial and industrial importance of the newly opened and improved eastern Siberia, western neighbor of the United States. The American article, written in a Herzenian spirit of a pre-destined Russo-American solidarity, concluded as follows: "When the Pacific railroad is finished and when Russia has an open sea-coast, the American and Muscovite can afford to look, the one west, the other east, over the Pacific—name of good omen—and turn their backs to Europe. . . ." In Herzen's answer to this article, we find the corresponding echo: "Both countries abound in force and plasticity. . . . Both from different directions step through immense space, marking their ways by towns, villages, colonies, toward the shores of the Pacific. This Mediterranean Sea of the future."

On Bakunin, Mr. Hecht exhausted the whole of the rather poor material on this errant anarchist to whom the United States seemed a much lesser evil than Old Europe.

Nicholas Chernyshevsky, of all the Russian radical publicists of the middle nineteenth century, gives the most solid and well-balanced appre-

ciation of the United States. The gravity center of Mr. Hecht's book are the three well written chapters on this Russian thinker. Mr. Hecht describes very well the inconsistency and the preconceptions which sometimes caused Chernyshevsky to distort the analysis of certain issues, including the causes of Russian emancipation and the American Civil War, as well as American federalism as adapted to Russian needs.

In the chapters devoted to Lavrov, Mr. Hecht dwells on Lavrov's idealization of American federalism and on his disappointment that the United States as a country was not inclined toward a socialist struggle. In connection with this should be noted a shortcoming of this study in not including the influence of Henry George's teaching on Russian political thought and particularly on the Populists.

A few inaccuracies have slipped into the text. The Tatar pseudonym for Herzen is not explained. Chernyshevsky is classified as a plebeian though he really belonged to the enlightened clergy. Russian Populism was pre-Marxian in origin, but it coexisted with Marxism and fought successfully against it until January, 1918.

Even if the concluding solution of the author is generally correct: namely, that with growing Marxism in the ranks of the radicals since the 1890's, American "illusions" faded away, it should, nevertheless, not be forgotten that these illusions remained powerful in moderate liberalism and that even Soviet Marxism did not get rid of the American legend.

MAX M. LASERSON

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FEDOTOV, G. P. (ed.). *A Treasury of Russian Spirituality*. New York, Sheed and Ward, 1948. 501 pp. \$6.50.

Despite the publication of numerous and sometimes excellent books on Russia, despite the gradual clarification, in the minds of the Americans, of the ends of present day Russia's policies, Russia still remains a puzzle. One of the causes is that, to understand a nation at work, one must know her past and, outside of Russia, knowledge and understanding of her past is still rare. It is, of course, very difficult to penetrate into a past so deeply permeated by religion which, though Christian, significantly departs from Western Christianity, not so much in dogmas as in forms and practices of spiritual life.

In the volume under review, Professor G. P. Fedotov, the author of many scholarly books on Russia, among them the excellent study of Russia's religious mind in the Kievan period, opens a good way of access to Russia's religious past. In the volume, only a few pages are his. The vast majority are devoted to the reproduction, in full or in long excerpts, of the most representative works expressing Russian spirituality, i.e. "religious life in its innermost and deepest state, the life with God and all spiritual experiences arising from this source." As the only departure from the principle of offering primary sources, A. F. Dobbie-Bateman's excellent essay on St. Seraphim is included, but this is followed by the only original source on the Saint, his conversation with N. Motovilov on the aim of Christian life.

The works compiled are preceded by short, but illuminating and well written introductions by Professor

Fedotov, giving the necessary biographical data and explaining the particular significance of each source. The selections, as Professor Fedotov modestly says, are not his since he has been guided by present day Russian ecclesiastical opinion. No objection could be raised against the selections except perhaps the last, Father A. Yelchaninov's diary. The author is a contemporary who died a few years ago, an exile in the midst of Russian exiles, so that, relating to him, no well-established opinion could yet be formed. Perhaps, there was no other work to represent "the residue of the great spiritual movement of the early twentieth century." Nevertheless, the significance of the work is conspicuously not the same as that of the other selections.

These selections are distributed along the four basic periods of the spiritual history of Russia. The first, or Kievan period, is represented by St. Theodosius, the first standard bearer of *kenoticism*, or the peculiarly Russian emphasis on the imitation of Christ in His self-humiliation. The Mongolian period (13th to 15th centuries) is represented by St. Sergius, the greatest of the Russian saints, and St. Nilus Sorsky, "the teacher of spiritual prayer." The Muscovite age (16th and 17th centuries) which, according to Fedotov, was very unfruitful with regard to spiritual life, is brought to the mind of the reader not by a representative of the official Church, but by a rebel, the leader of the Old Believers, arch priest Avvakum. The Imperial period (18th and 19th centuries) receives expression in St. Tykhon who for a long time was the most beloved saint of modern Russia; St. Seraphim whose mystical life ex

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erted powerful attraction on the generation of the Orthodox Renaissance, the last before the Revolution; an anonymous author whose "Candid narration of a pilgrimage to his spiritual father" gives a convincingly detailed description of mental prayer as practised by a layman; and the somewhat dubious Father John of Cronstadt, simultaneously a genius of prayer and a fervent supporter of reaction. To close the series there comes Yelchaninov's diary, already mentioned.

The translation of the Russian texts is good. A few illustrations, mainly reproducing churches and icons, give the reader additional insight into Russian spirituality.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

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Istoria russkoi literatury XIX v.

(History of Russian 19th Century Literature) edited by D. N. Ovsyaniko-Kulikovskiy, Moscow, 1908-1911. Russian Reprint Series of the A. C. L. S. Published by J. W. Edwards, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 1948. 5 vols. \$32.00.

The Russian Reprint Program of the American Council of Learned Societies is to be congratulated for making available, through photolithoprint reproduction, this well-known five-volume set on Russian nineteenth century literature. Like so many other important scholarly works of pre-revolutionary Russia, this one has long been unobtainable. The decision to reproduce it in the original rather than undertake its translation into English also seems to have been a wise one. With all its merits, the work has definite limitations and is in some respects out of date.

Since most students of Russian literature are familiar with these volumes, what seems desirable here is merely to remind them of the scope and content of this work.

The *Istoria* . . . is a collection of articles by prominent, chiefly Marxist, critics, historians, and publicists, under the general editorship of the well-known scholar and editor, D. N. Ovsyaniko-Kulikovskiy. It is in no sense a conventional "history of literature"; primarily, it is an exposé of the social and political background of nineteenth century Russian literature. The approach and viewpoint of the editors and contributors is Socialist-Marxist. Literature, in other words, is studied as a reflection of the social, political, and economic milieu of a given period. The general tone is anti-clerical, materialist, and sharply critical of the Tsarist government. The fact that censorship allowed its publication offers, incidentally, an interesting example of the relative freedom of expression in the years of the constitutional régime.

The general plan of the work is as follows: first comes a historical essay on a given period, i.e., the Epoch of Alexander I, 1801-1825, the Great Reforms, etc.; this is followed by an essay on the intellectual life of the period; and finally by an article on the literary trends and schools of that period. These three introductory articles are then followed by essays on individual writers. The last volume (V) contains an excellent general bibliography, chronological tables of historical, literary, and journalistic events, and biographical data on individual authors. The work is profusely illustrated.

The historical essays are among the best, particularly on the 1840's,

the 1860's, and the period 1884-1905. Of special interest are articles devoted to individual nineteenth century critics and publicists. Of these, George Plekhanov's essays on Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, N. S. Rusanov's on Peter Lavrov, and A. Kornilov's on M. N. Katkov are particularly interesting, since works about the nineteenth century Russian critics and publicists are exceedingly few, even in Russian.

As one would expect from the editor's approach to literature, individual writers whose social and political views are in harmony with

those of the editors receive by and large a better and often more extensive treatment than their literary reputations warrant. Thus, while the novelist, Saltykov-Shchedrin, gets fifty-three pages, Dostoevsky gets only fifty, and Leskov—twenty.

With these limitations in mind, students, and especially teachers of Russian literature in American universities, should find these volumes most valuable as sources of reference and as teaching aids.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT
Dartmouth College

BOOK NOTICES

CROWSON, P., *A History of the Russian People*, London and New York, Longmans, Green, 1948. 225 pp. \$1.50.

Very brief sketch ranging from the ancient Slavs to 1947. Written as a text-book for English "School-Certificate candidates."

DEGRAS, J. (Compiler) *Calendar of Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, (1917-1941)*, London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948. (Obtainable from the New York office at 542 Fifth Avenue.) 248 pp. \$4.50.

Very useful guide to source materials in Russian and English, including: treaties, agreements, diplomatic correspondence, speeches, and articles from the Soviet press. Classification is by period and subjects. Indispensable research tool.

GOLLERBAKH, E. F., *Istoriya gravyury i litografii v Rossii*, Moscow, 1923. Russian Reprint Program of the A.C.L.S. J. W. Edwards, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1948. 217 pp. \$5.75.

An excellent historical survey of Russian engraving. Illustrated; contains a bibliography.

The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949. 79 pp. 50c.

Full texts of: letters exchanged between Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Parties (March-May, 1948) Cominform declaration; statements to Cominform by Yugoslav C. P. (June, 1948).

"The Current Soviet Thought Series," Issued in Cooperation with the Russian Translation Program of the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1948- .

Book Publishing in Soviet Russia. (30 pp.) Translation by H. L. SHADICK of an article from the October 10, 1947, issue of *Sovetskaya Kniga*. General and specific tables showing: number of titles, editions, copies, etc. Based on official data.

GOLYAKOV, I. T., *The Role of the Soviet Court*. (20 pp.) Translation by R. KRAMER of a published lecture delivered in 1947 by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. A discussion of the Soviet attitude toward crime and a comparison with the alleged attitude of the United States.

KOVALYOV, S., *Ideological Conflicts in Soviet Russia*. (19 pp.) Translation of an article originally published in *Bolshevik* under the title: "Communist Education of the Worker and the Elimination of Capitalist Survivals from the Popular Consciousness." An excoriation of "the capitalist survivals."

ALEKSANDROV, G. F., *The Pattern of Soviet Democracy*. (32 pp.) Translation of a speech delivered before Soviet Academy of Sci-

ences in December, 1946. Eulogy of "Soviet democracy" and an attack upon some critics of "Soviet democracy."

EGOLIN, A. M., *The Ideological Content of Soviet Literature*. (22 pp.) Translation by M. KRIGER of notes of a 1946 lecture which reiterated that the duty of Soviet writers was to serve "the cause of consolidating the achievements of October and the Building of a Communist society."

MENDELSON, M., *Soviet Interpretation of Contemporary American Literature*. (28 pp.) Translation by D. B. BROWN and R. W. MATHEWSON of published transcript of a 1947 lecture. Theodore Dreiser and Howard Fast come off rather well but there is scant praise for Caldwell, Steinbeck and the others.

VOZNESENSKY, N. A., *The Economy of the USSR during World War II*. (103 pp.) Mr. Voznesensky's very important and now famous policy statement.

Soviet Views on the Post-War World Economy. (125 pp.) Translation by L. GRULIOW of the official transcript of the attack on Varga for the views he expressed in his *Changes in the Economy of Capitalism*. This is therefore the official expression of the new "line."

PLIEVER, T., *Stalingrad*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948. 357 pp. \$3.00.

A novel of the disintegration of the German forces at Stalingrad. Brutally frank description of horrors. Not without political undertones.

The Third Hour, Issue IV, N. Y., 1949. 118 pp. \$1.50.

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U.S.S.R. Supplement of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (SSR tom, Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya), Moscow, Ogiz, 1947. Russian Reprint program of the A.C.L.S. Universal Press, Baltimore, Md., 1949. 1946 pp. \$14.00.

An indispensable source of reference. Edited by S. I. Vavilov, K. Voroshilov, A. Vishinsky, and other leaders of the Bolshevik Party. This volume contains the following major sections: History of the Russian Communist Party, Philosophy and Psychology, Economics, History of Russia and the U.S.S.R., Labor Movement and Trade Unions, Geography, Literature and the Arts, Education, Technology, Agriculture, the State Law, the Sciences, Religion, and brief survey of the 16 Union Republics; also a chronological table, a general bibliography, maps; is profusely illustrated.

WHITE, W. L., *Land of Milk and Honey*. Harcourt, Brace and Company New York, 1949. 312 pp. \$3.00.

This is an account of a true story of a young Soviet Russian who escaped from his Socialist fatherland and is now in this country. Mr. White has told his story in terms of "intimate details and comparison" with the aim of giving Americans "a true picture of the new Soviet man, what he is like, how he reacts, what he thinks and why."

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